Daily Report

East Europe

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Videnov, Papandreou Agree on Declaration Text

AU2006102795 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 20 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Today is the second day of Bulgarian Prime Minister Zhan Videnov's visit to Greece. Our reporter Kalina Stancheva reports from Athens:

[Begin recording] Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou's public appearances have recently become a rare event. His appearance at the Bulgarian Embassy reception late yesterday was thus regarded as a special gesture.

No signing of any agreement during the event was envisaged. Last night, however, after the Greek prime minister had succeeded in escaping from the siege of the numerous television crews, he sat with our Prime Minister Zhan Videnov at a table in the embassy's garden and became acquainted with the text of a joint declaration that had earlier been agreed in the same place by Ministers Tsochev and Papoulias.

Mr. Papandreou approved the text of the declaration. Afterward he invited the Bulgarian delegation to his private villa today to sign it.

Issues related to the Mesta River water and the construction of four new border checkpoints are contained in the declaration.

As we understand from explanations we were given earlier, the Russian participation in the future Trans-Balkan Company will be about 50 percent. The rest will be equally divided between Bulgaria and Greece.

At a meeting at the Greek Ministry of Labor that is currently under way the controversial issue of reciprocity in the agreement on seasonal workers, which is now being prepared, is being discussed. This agreement has nothing to do with another agreement that is being prepared, and which deals with illegal immigrant workers in the two countries. [end recording]

OPT: CIA Contribution to Global Balkan Conflict

AU2006102895 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 14 Jun 95 p 3

[Staff report: "Allies of Bulgarian Socialist/Communist Party Predict Military Conflict in Macedonia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The allies of the Bulgarian Socialist/Communist Party from the Fatherland Party of Labor [OPT] announced on 13 June that they did not exclude the possibility of a military conflict in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. Reportedly, OPT leader Mincho Minchev has reached this conclusion after observing for a long time the processes in Kosovo and relations between Greece and Turkey. According to the nationalists, the CIA, which "has means of mass influence," would contribute to the eruption of a global Balkan conflict. Minchev's script continued by saying that Turkey had long been interested in taking part in the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict and he predicted that "Bulgaria will not remain indifferent" if the war spreads to Macedonian territory.

The OPT confirmed that it views the Bulgarian Socialist Party as its main partner with whom it will cooperate in the forthcoming municipal elections. The nationalists will seek contacts with all leftist forces, including Vladimir Spasov's Bulgarian Communist Party. The OPT, which had an agreement with the skinheads in the December 1994 parliamentary elections, now swears that it will not ally itself with organizations that profess a fascist ideology.

Nuclear Plant Needs 6 Billion Leva for Fuel

AU1906120195 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 15 Jun 95 p 5

[Report by Veselka Marinova from Kozloduy]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kozma Kuzmanov, manager of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant, informed journalists yesterday that the plant needs 6 billion leva [Lv] to purchase nuclear fuel and about Lv1 million for this year's repair program. When Deputy Prime Minister Kiril Tsochev visited the plant on 13 June, agreement was reached that everything possible will be done to provide finances for the fuel and repair work.

Since the beginning of 1995, the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant has generated 9.3 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity, for which it received Lv1.325 billion in payment. The present production cost of the electricity generated is Lv1.20 per kilowatt-hour.

At the moment, the first reactor unit is being overhauled. The work includes testing the state of the metal in the reactor shell to confirm its fitness for further operation.

Commentary on NAA Conference, NATO Membership

AU2006121195 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 15 Jun 95 p 7

[Commentary by Tanya Geneva: "NATO Membership Does Not Mean Automatic Security"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The three-day "Rose-Roth" Conference, organized by the North Atlantic Assembly [NAA] and hosted by the Bulgarian Parliament, did not produce one major news item or a shattering scandal. The hopes of the kibitzers, who expected a big rabbit

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to jump out of the conference's hat, were foiled. They thought that since so many North Atlantic experts had come to Bulgaria, albeit related only to the pact's parliamentary structure, that something big must come of the conference. There was not one single participant who took the floor and shouted: "Immediately get into NATO! Declare immediately your candidacy and think afterward about the consequences!"

The most positive factor for Bulgaria was that it hosted such a forum. The "Rose-Roth" conferences have thus far been held in almost every East European country. Last year was our country's turn, but the event was postponed until 1995 because of the commotion from the parliamentary elections. The purpose of the conference is for NATO member countries and countries associated in the assembly, such as Bulgaria, to get to know each other and exchange information, opinions, and positions.

The direction and essence of the discussion were predetermined to a large degree by Bulgaria's position on the issue of regional stability and security. The guests really wanted to hear what Sofia leaders think about the volatile region in which they are living and what their opinion is about the solutions proposed by them. Our native opposition demonstrated in a timid manner that it had been insulted by the fact that its representatives had not been invited, in addition to the prime minister, foreign minister, National Assembly chairman, and General Staff head, to present their views. However, even those who complained knew that their complaint had the taste of salted coffee.

The effort to create a conflict because of the fact that no representative of the presidency had been invited also failed. Except for the exceptionally extravagant Lord Lucas, who appeared to be very well informed about the interinstitutional friction in Sofia regarding our membership in NATO, no one succumbed to the small provocation. Against the background of what was really happening in the Hotel Vitosha's conference hall, the attempt to concoct a typical Bulgarian intrigue regarding the fact that no NATO symbols were evident and that the behavior of the Bulgarian organizers was nothing short of a diplomatic scandal appeared pathetic.

Now about our position. When one attends such gatherings, even as an observer from the side—in other words, showing an "international participation" of sorts, as our officials like to say—one suddenly grasps the naked truth about opposition politicians. It suddenly becomes clear that the stormy passions in parliament are only bait for internal consumption. When our opposition politicians meet people outside the circle of Agov [deputy chairman of the Union of Democratic Forces] and Company, they suddenly behave humbly, nod sagely, ask careful questions, absorb every word said in English, and generally become sweet as honey.

The arrival of North Atlantic Assembly President Voigt on the last day of the forum irrevocably eliminated the expectations of a storm and "immediately and unconditionally" turned the adherents to the NATO position into withered flowers. Only the aforementioned Agov succeeded in showing the "high-ranking boss" how he can quarrel with National Assembly Chairman Blagovest Sendov. Of course, this does not mean that Sendov was extremely impressed by Agov or that Voigt noticed the show that the former international journalist put on.

It is much easier to leave NATO than to join it. The pact's door is open, but not at any cost. No one needs a state that does not emanate security. Those elementary truths were said by Voigt in an authoritative, categorical, and peremptory manner.

It was not by accident that after the meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly with the National Assembly Commissions on Foreign Affairs and National Security, a deputy said that economy, reforms and the consensus on them, and conducting a consistent policy which clearly shows elements of continuity were the main subjects discussed. Thank God it was Voigt who invoked all those subjects, Foreign Affairs Commission Chairman Kamov sighed with relief.

Perhaps one of the lessons of the three-day conference in Sofia should precisely be that such conferences must be conducted like the one held in Sofia—without news items and scandals. The issue is not that much "out or in NATO." The main issue is our country's national security.

NATO membership does not mean automatic security. It was Karsten Voigt who said this.

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Beijing Protests Taiwanese Premier's Visit

AU1906130195 Paris AFP in English 1229 GMT 19 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Prague, June 19 (AFP)—China has formally protested to the Czech Republic over a private visit to Prague by the Taiwanese Prime Minister Lien Chan, a Chinese embassy spokesman told AFP Monday [19 June].

He said the Beijing government "had expressed its extreme displeasure" at the three-day visit, which it considered as a new diplomatic offensive by Taiwan and "was closely following this event."

Lien left Taiwan Thursday night for a visit to Europe where no countries maintain official relations with his country. Few details of his itinerary were released, though he has stopped briefly in Amsterdam and Vienna. He is the first Taiwanese premier to visit Europe and his trip is being seen as a diplomatic coup.

Taiwanese sources have said their U.S.-oriented foreign policy has left them few friends in Europe and that Lien's visit meant that Taiwan had won greater recognition from other countries.

It follows the granting by the United States of a visa to Taiwanese President Li Teng-hui to attend a university reunion. China warned over the weekend that the decision had led Sino-U.S. relations into a "danger zone."

Beijing regards Taiwan, controlled by the nationalists since 1949, as a breakaway province of China and bitterly opposes any action taken by foreign countries which might be taken as a recognition of the independent status of the island.

Czech Premier Vaclav Klaus had a "short informal meeting with Lien" Monday morning, Klaus's office said. It gave no details of the whereabouts, length or content of the meeting.

The office of Czech President Vaclav Havel said that "he would not be meeting the Taiwanese premier as he was out of town" at Pilsen, 100 kilometres (60 miles) west of Prague on Monday and Tuesday.

Lien is accompanied by his wife and the Taiwanese education minister. On Sunday he called at a dinner with Czech journalists for more trade between the two countries. Tuesday he is due to give a talk at the Charles University to some 50 Czech academics on the theme of university reform and development.

A university spokesman said the invitation to Lien had been made "in his capacity as professor of political science at the University of Taiwan."

Seminar Focuses on Need for Bankruptcy Laws

95CH0276A Prague PRAGUE POST in English 7 Jun 95 p 9

[Article by David Fondler: "Seminar Focuses on Flaws in the Country's Bankruptcy Laws"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The prospect of filing for bankruptcy may seem like the most negative aspect of conversation to a market economy—but without bankruptcy, a market economy cannot exist. That's why more bankruptcies would not necessarily be a problem for the Czech economy.

Convincing businesses of this may be a difficult task. Still, a two-day seminar on May 30-31 focused on the need to free up bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings in the courts, along with other methods of legally guaranteeing debt, as a way to encourage bank lending and other business investments.

The seminar was held partially to highlight release of the first phase of a study by the accounting firm of Deloitte & Touche on the viability of bankruptcy proceedings in the Czech Republic, part of a larger project covering 13 countries in Central and East Europe. The study, which was funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), concludes that while some gains in the Czech law have been made, significant reforms are still needed.

"It's a tremendous problem," said Arlene Mirsky, an attourney with the New Jersey firm of Hannoch Weisman. "It's stifling the extension of credit. Businesses say they have no place to borrow money."

Mirsky—who in the United States specializes in bankruptcy from the creditors side—has been studying the different legal approaches to bankruptcy throughout Central Europe. She says most former communist countries recognize the need for bankruptcy as a tool in economic reform, but most have been lax in adopting practical bankruptcy procedures.

The Czech Republic is no exception.

Mirsky and other speakers at the seminar discussed the lack of incentive—and even some disincentives—for companies to go through bankruptcy as either creditors or debtors. These included long court delays, lack of a court infrustructure to handle bankruptcies and the fact that "bankruptcy is viewed as a disruptive factor," said Michael Clark, an accountant with Deloitte & Touche and a co-author of the report.

One of the highlighted points was the ironic reluctance with which Czech bankruptcy law was adopted. The law was enacted in 1991 but was placed under a

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moratorium for two years. Since 1993, while there have been many insolvent Czech businesses, only a handful—just over 300, according to the report—have actually sought bankruptcy protection.

What businesses and perhaps the government don't fully understand is that bankruptcy is not necessarily all bad. If used properly, it can protect a business' investors and creditors, while keeping the business operating and its employees working. This is part of a macroeconomic culture of debt that has yet to catch on in Central Europe, Mirsky said.

Ironically, it's also macroeconomic factors in the Czech Republic that are keeping bankruptcies from being used, she added. One is the high amount of foreign investment here as equity—meaning there's less of a creditor incentive for persuing better bankruptcy laws as a means to protect investments.

Another factor is the intertwined relationship between many Czech banks and the investment funds that hold shares in most of the privatized businesses the banks could be lending to. Because many banks also have controlling interests in the funds, they could find themselves at both ends of a bankruptcy.

To defend Czech banking law, but also to concur with the points presented by the Westerners at the seminar, was Judge Frantisek Zoulik, an advisor in the Czech Ministry of Justice.

"You cannot ignore 50 years during which all we had was liquidation of state-owned companies in favor of the command economy," Zoulik said.

Zoulik discussed a proposed series of ammendments to the Czech bankruptcy act that the government hopes to introduce by Jan. 1 1996. The proposed measures include better ways to account for and protect a failing business's assets before filing a bankruptcy claim, time limits on creditors' claims and methods for moving the bankruptcy proceedings through the court system.

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Diplomatic Relations Begun With Saudi Arabia

AU2006111695 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 19 Jun 95 p 15

[TASR report in the "Briefly" column]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Slovak Republic and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have assumed diplomatic relations at embassy level. The protocol on the establishment of diplomatic relations was signed by representatives of the two states' missions to the United Nations in New York on Saturday, 17 June.

Hungarian Minority Issues Komarno Declaration

95CH0255A Bratislava SZABAD UJSAG in Hungarian 3 May 95 p 9

[Statement issued on 22 April 1995 in Komarno: "The Position of the General Educational Meeting of Hungarians in Slovakia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Under the condition of respecting their individual and communal rights, Hungarians living in Slovakia constitute an integral part of Slovak society and, at the same time, they are an integral part of the Hungarian nation by virtue of the various elements of their culture, their language, their history, their traditions, their family relations, and their national identity.

This—politically, historically, and culturally determined—double allegiance must be dealt with as a historical fact. The Hungarian national community in Slovakia repudiates any and all efforts the purpose of which is to undermine this allegiance by forcible or artificial means. Hungarians in Slovakia demand, both individually and as a community, that the conditions necessary for their social development be created in accordance with this double allegiance. Hungarians living in Slovakia demand that they be allowed to be a community, an equal partner in the Slovak nation, and that their communal rights, and the protection, continuation and development of their national identity be codified by law. As taxpaying citizens, Hungarians have the right to receive, in proportion to their relative numbers, funds from the national budget for the operation of their educational institutions, and to be allowed to make decisions through their elected bodies—in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity—in affairs in which they are involved.

As a result of this demand, the participants at the general meeting assessed the situation in the education system of the Hungarian national community in Slovakia, and established the short-range and long-range requirements for its development.

On the Situation in the Education System of the Hungarian National Community in Slovakia and the Necessary Immediate Measures

The education system of Hungarians living in Slovakia has been continuously deteriorating ever since they became a minority 77 years ago. There was only one period in Hungarian education in Slovakia that presented some hope. This period was between 1950 and 1964 when Hungarian education indeed developed in accordance with the demands of that time. Subsequently, it fell victim again to restrictions, and the Hungarian language was almost entirely removed from public affairs. From 1978 to the present, Hungarian schools have been victims of intentional and programmed restrictions, the number of teachers have been decreasing and, since 1990, a discriminating law has put restrictions on the use of our native language.

For decades, our education has been struggling with a shortage of teachers, equipment, and buildings, as well as with a lack of willingness on the part of the state. Justification for teaching in our native language is solely determined by the state, not by citizens or demand. Education is still the main area in which state totalitarianism can be followed, even though Slovakia's political system has formally become pluralistic. The only reason why education in Slovakia has not been delegated to local governments is not to allow elected Hungarians to have a voice in matters of education.

As of January 1995, the present administration approved a program of gradual abolition of Hungarian education through the introduction of a bilingual—i.e., the so-called alternative—education system, which is merely another version of the kind of linguistic imperialism whose primary example used to be the former Soviet Union.

It is public education—whose sole Hungarian institution is CSEMADOK [Cultural Association of Hungarians in Slovakia]—that suffered the most. The approval of CSEMADOK's operation can only be considered provisional. This proved to be a positive thing during the communist era, since at that time everything depended on the party and the state. Now the state wants to take away even what we had achieved and created under great risks and hardship.

The development of our culture needs 300 million korunas from the national budget. However, during the past two or three years, the national budget included only 130 million to 140 million korunas for all minorities, of which only 80 million was allotted to Hungarian culture. In 1995, the administration eliminated even this minimal subsidy.

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The administration's program foreshadowed further dangerous encroachments in the lives of Hungarians in Slovakia. It took away the basic elements of our identity. In the past few months, no Hungarian press was to be found in Slovakia, except for Slovakian newspapers published in Hungarian. For this reason, the state subsidy of the Hungarian press has been discontinued, including the subsidy that had been approved earlier.

We strongly protest against such measures taken by the political power establishment. It is our conviction that the decisions that are made against the Hungarian community threaten not only us but the very future of Slovakia. Every measure of the political power establishment which violates the principle of civil autonomy threatens democracy as a whole in Slovakia.

For an immediate remedy of this situation, we demand:

- that the administration abandon the bilingual (the so-called alternative) education system in Hungarian schools;
- that the president refrain from signing the modification of statute 542/1990, which has been approved by Parliament, because it violates the principle of autonomy; that Parliament rescind the modification at its second reading;
- that the Ministry of Education recognize the system of higher education that was organized by the Komarom [Komarno] and Kiralyhelmec [Kralovsky Chlmec] city universities as a legal way of professional training for future careers;
- that [the Ministry of Education] immediately resume subsidies for the public educational institutions of the Hungarian and other minorities, at least to the amounts determined in 1994;
- that an independent Hungarian section be established at the Nyitra [Nitra] College of Education;
- that, in order to halt the deterioration of Hungarian public education and mass communication, CSEMADOK and publishers of the national presses receive state subsidies, at least in the amounts of earlier years;
- that all those who have been dismissed since December 1994 for political reasons be reinstated in their former positions by the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Culture.

We support the activity of the Alliance of Hungarian Educators in Slovakia to improve the standards of our schools. For a more efficient representation of the interests of Hungarian educators, we propose that the National Committee of the SZMPSZ [expansion unknown] be transformed into a union of the alliance if this is supported by the membership.

We advocate that the Hungarian Education Council in Slovakia should be established as soon as possible for the purpose of dealing with the crisis situation in Hungarian public education.

On the Conditions for the Development of the Education of the Hungarian National Community in Slovakia

The starting point of the participants at the general meeting was that an undisrupted development of public education, in accordance with public demand, can only take place under democratic conditions and only through the observance of the principle of autonomy. This means that government agencies should only coordinate, provide the necessary funds for operation, and monitor the adherence to the basic requirements of schooling.

An availability of state funds, a control of the use of per capita quotas, and the unrestricted use of these proportionately allocated funds by local governments are the general basic requirements for public education, higher education, and access to and dissemination of information. The law provides for the establishment and maintenance of educational autonomies. The press and the public media should be free of government intervention and independent of the state's power establishment.

From the aspect of the development of the education of the Hungarian national community in Slovakia, the participants at the general meeting consider the following to be fundamental requirements:

- the right to a comprehensive educational system in the Hungarian language, from kindergarten to university, provided by law;
- separate budget funds for the education of the Hungarian national community in Slovakia; the amount should be proportional to the number of Hungarian citizens; in accordance with the principle of autonomy, the Hungarian community should be allowed to decide on its own with regard to the distribution and use of this budget item;
- the Hungarian language should be the official language, alongside the Slovak language, in every town or village in which Hungarians constitute the majority, or at least 10 percent, of the population;
- the government of the Slovak Republic should sign, and its parliament should ratify, the European Community's Minority Charta or Charta of Regional Languages.

The participants at the general meeting consider the following extremely important for the Hungarian national community:

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a) The right to preserve, protect, and develop one's national, cultural, and linguistic identity;

b) The right to preserve and develop one's spiritual and material values;

c) The right to learn and be educated in one's native language at every level and in one's preferred format within a school system financed by public funds, and in schools whose locations are in accordance with the Hungarian national community's geographic distribution and the types of its communities;

d) The right to maintain and operate other schools and educational institutions;

e) The right to establish and operate educational and scientific institutions;

f) The right to obtain and disseminate information in one's native language;

g) The right to establish and operate institutions and associations of public education;

h) The right to keep in contact, without any government intervention, with persons, communities, and institutions, both within the country and abroad, who or which have the same national, cultural, and linguistic interests;

i) The right to establish representative and executive organizations through which one can independently and autonomously make decisions with any issue that is significant from the aspect of preserving and developing one's identity, especially in issues of public education and the use of one's native language and one's own national symbols.

In Case the Hungarian National Community's Legal Status Is Constitutionally Regulated

In accordance with the principle of autonomy stated in the 8 January 1994 declaration of the elected Hungarian representatives and mayors, autonomous organizations of special legal status, established on the basis of Proposition 1201 of the European Council's General Parliamentary Meeting, would have the authority to control culture and education, and oversee financing and methodology.

The participants of the general meeting consider it essential that, in accordance with the principles of democracy, the legal status of the Hungarian national community living in Slovakia be codified by law in the above manner and in connection with the listed issues during the course of a nationwide restructuring of public administration and the expansion of local government authority.

Komarno22 April 1995

'Level One' Malfunction Reported at Bohunice

AU2006105695 Bratislava SME in Slovak 17 Jun 95 p 2

[TASR report: "Malfunction at Bohunice"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The reactor of the first unit of the Jaslovske Bohunice nuclear power plant was automatically switched off Thursday afternoon [15 June], during a planned check of the safety system [ochran]. The safety of the unit was not affected, however, and no leak of radioactive substances occurred. The operation of the first unit was gradually resumed again last night. According to the International Nuclear Event Scale (7 levels), the malfunction was assessed as level 1, which means deviation [as published; level 1 on the INES scale is "anomoly," while "deviation" is below scale or level 0].

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Keleti on NATO Membership, Army Reform

AU2006120695 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 17 Jun 95 p 10

[Interview with Hungarian Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti by Dezso Pinter; place and date not given: "Security Has Its Price"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Pinter] Can we count on new military elements when considering the security of the Hungarian Republic?

[Keleti] These new elements developed in the course of a long time. NATO highly appreciates Hungary's prudent attitude in the Yugoslav conflict. This also plays a role in the fact that high-ranking NATO officials repeatedly said that NATO would not be idle in the case of a possible expansion of the conflict that would also threaten Hungary. So far, it seems that the sides in the Yugoslav conflict do not turn against outside forces. It would be a dangerous change if an armed conflict broke out for the possession of eastern Slavonia between the people living there and the Croats. This area is in the immediate vicinity of the Hungarian border, and a large number of ethnic Hungarians are living there; we are continuously following their fate with great concern. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] According to various observers, the circles in charge of Russian foreign policy have been attributing increased importance to military considerations lately. What is your opinion on this?

[Keleti] Russia's leading politicians repeatedly changed their opinion on NATO's expansion. Russia continues to be a big power, and if it is so uncertain about such an important issue, this shows unpredictability. Mr. Grachev declared that as long as he is defense minister, he would not agree to expand NATO. This and several other similar statements enables us to conclude that the weight of the military leadership is increasing in both Russian foreign and domestic policy. According to some people, the explanation also lies in the Russian character, which respects soldiers. The army in Russia today is an organized force that can serve as an example for the citizens afraid of general chaos. If this process continues to strengthen, I fear that the democratic changes important for both the improvement of Russian domestic situation and the future of Europe might not take place. If the army emerges as a determining political force, this will have a different impact on Russia's future place and role in Europe. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] What kinds of attitude do the NATO members display toward Hungary's demand to become a NATO member?

[Keleti] We need 16 "yes" votes—in other words, every member country must declare that they regard the NATO expansion and Hungary's acceptance as necessary. There is a general positive approach, but there are countries that think a more moderate pace is necessary. Generally, the southern European NATO countries might think that in case of expansion, the aid within NATO could be slightly regrouped. The other countries have a largely identical position, but all the countries without exception say that before joining NATO, the countries in East-Central Europe must settle their controversial issues among themselves.

[Pinter] To what extent are the Hungarian Government's efforts for NATO membership accompanied by a consensus of parliamentary parties?

[Keleti] This support is consistent and clear. For example, I find it promising that the head of the parliamentary group of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] welcomed the recent meeting of the NATO Assembly in Budapest and expressed the support of the opposition on the issue of Hungary's NATO membership. In addition to the six parties represented in parliament, every considerable political force in Hungary agrees with Hungary's intention to become a NATO member. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] Do you see any danger in the fact that some steps of the planned reform of the armed forces, like the strong reduction in personnel, might lead to confrontation with the headquarters of the Hungarian Army?

[Keleti] It is too early to come up with exact data, but we must take into consideration a reduction in personnel of about 30 percent by 1998. This will mainly affect the regular soldiers, but it is also expected to affect the professional soldiers. Several army barracks will be closed and some army units will be eliminated. It seems that quite a number of officers and warrant officers will refuse to accept the unpleasant things connected with transfer to other locations and the new positions and, instead, they will request retirement. In the case of civilian employees, we expect a considerable reduction in personnel after coordination with the trade unions. More than 20 generals will reach retirement age at the end of 1996, so they will have to leave the army. This is important for younger personnel, including those who studied in the West, to be able to advance on the strict hierarchy and to have the opportunity to implement their concepts. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] How can you describe the current technological stand of the Hungarian Army?

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[Keleti] To answer this question, one must also take into consideration the military capability of the neighboring countries. The armies of countries that plan to become NATO members must fulfill certain compatibility requirements. Such a compatibility must first of all be achieved in telecommunication and in creating the conditions of leadership. In addition, airspace control and air defense also require a relatively rapid introduction of European standards. On the basis of a government approval, an international tender will soon be issued on restructuring our radar system. From this restructuring, we hope for more modern installations and also savings in manpower and energy. As for the radio communication systems, it is primarily necessary to enable the Hungarian units in the framework of the partnership of peace to carry out their activities according to the requirements demanded by NATO cooperation.

[Pinter] No one knows yet the system of conditions, including technical conditions, that NATO will set up for the future members, but development is already necessary. In view of this uncertainty, is the Hungarian defense leadership facing big risks in using the budget allocations?

[Keleti] There is indeed no written document on the system of conditions, but negotiations conducted with NATO military leaders and experts so far clearly showed the areas in which we need to create compatibility. We are not talking here about any need to fully reorganize the army overnight. Spain became a NATO member 13 years ago and, according to the Spanish defense minister, the country was granted eight to 10 years to reorganize its army. The countries that will become NATO members in the future will also receive at least five to seven years for that purpose. Hungary will also make the necessary purchases in the line of necessary development and according to strict tenders. [passage omitted]

Border Police Reinforcement at Southern Border

AU2006095995 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 17 Jun 95 p 3

[Interview with Border Police Headquarters Spokesman Attila Krisan by Attila Lenart; place and date not given: "Are the Border Police Mobilizing Troops?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Krisan] A new Border Police unit was deployed along our southern border yesterday, in addition to the existing two companies. We asked Border Police Headquarters Spokesman Attila Krisan about the reasons behind this deployment and whether troops are being mobilized.

[Krisan] The deployment of a unit made up of a few dozen border policemen is neither mobilization nor military reinforcement. We do not fear any large-scale military action. We simply provide help to the professional border patrols, because attempts to violate the embargo have increased lately. Recently, a smuggler fired shots at a border guard and then jumped out of his car and ran to Serbian territory. We would like to avoid such incidents.

[Lenart] Will a few dozen extra border guards be enough for this task?

[Krisan] They can help a lot. There will now be two guards in areas where there has been only one guard until now, and they will be able to set up obstacles. A block of concrete or an obstacle made of wood with barbed wire can hold off smugglers and perhaps they will not fill up the border ditches. For example, the smuggler I mentioned before took a lot of bricks along to use as a bridge over the border.

[Lenart] Is the Border Police on alert in connection with the Yugoslav situation?

[Krisan] As opposed to the army, an alert at the Border Police means nothing else. We are constantly on alert, and we must constantly patrol the border. A very big event must take place for us to order a special alert.

[Lenart] Which border zone is the most difficult for the Border Police?

[Krisan] The 66 kilometers of joint border with the Republic of Serb Krajina. Here there is barbed wire, tank obstacles, and even mines. But there are no diplomatic relations between the two countries. We warn everyone not to approach that border.

Prime Minister Criticized for 'Begging' in West

AU2006115395 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 15 Jun 95 pp 1, 4

[Unattributed report: "Insults Before Agenda—Gyula Horn's Report on His Experiences"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In his speech before the agenda in parliament on 14 June, Prime Minister Gyula Horn said that rather than beg, they had gone to the United States to request support. Horn entered into an argument with the opposition because it had constantly criticized the results of his U.S. trip.

Horn said that the reason might be the opposition's disappointment because he had not mentioned the opposition during his visit. He listed all the U.S. politicians he had met, and he mentioned that he had visited four major daily newspapers and several large companies.

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He also said that the Hungarians living in emigration had received the Hungarian delegation with much affection. He also emphasized that Finance Minister Lajos Bokros and Gyorgy Suranyi, chairman of the Hungarian National Bank, were given recognition in the United States.

He said that during his visit, he managed to strengthen confidence in Hungary, and the government's stabilization program received support. The signing of the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty was given recognition and so was Hungary's plan to achieve a similar agreement with Romania. He said that the confidence of major international financial organizations had been shaken when the previous government had not fulfilled its own obligations. The visit surpassed all expectations, Horn summed up his opinion, and added that this is one of the reasons he is indignant about the opposition terming his visit a failure.

In his reply, Jozsef Torgyan [chairman of the Independent Smallholders Party] said that the opposition had followed the U.S. visit with attention and, as adherents of political realism, they established on the basis of facts that the high-level visit had been a failure. Referring to Tatar customs, he said that Horn had only received bones instead of a bowl of meat, he had not been given the otherwise customary 19 salvoes of cannonfire, a presidential dinner, or a special airplane, and he had not managed to hold a chat by the fireplace. If the United States likes Bokros's package and the 16 million forints he received as severance pay, then the United States can have these, Torgyan said. He repeated that Horn had gone to the United States to beg, this whole trip had been badly prepared, and he had discredited the whole Hungarian nation.

Zoltan Pokorni (Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party) said they were so surprised by Horn's speech that they could not properly react to it and would later express their views in writing. Ivan Peto [chairman of the Alliance of Free Democrats, SZDSZ] called Torgyan's reaction undignified for Hungarian parliament. In his improvised reply, Torgyan refused the tone used by Peto and said that he could understand the SZDSZ leader's despair because he had spoken out of his disappointment.

Tamas Isepy (Christian Democratic People's Party) expressed his delight that Horn had reported on his U.S. trip to parliament, however, he warned Horn that respect for the Hungarians has not been started in 1995—it also includes 1956, the dismantling of the party state, and the results of the past four years. Imre Konya (Hungarian Democratic Forum) objected to Horn's statements made abroad, and repeatedly called attention to the interview published in the SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG. In this, he created a negative image for all parties of the Hungarian parliament. After the U.S. visit, the United States will remain exactly the same, but a new domestic political situation has arisen in Hungary, Konya concluded his contribution. Imre Szekeres (Hungarian Socialist Party) called the criticisms and assessments expressed in the past 10 days inexplicable, and he said that only the opposition's arrogance is bigger than that of the government. Szekeres then explained that he uses Peto rather than Torgyan as a role model. Torgyan agreed with this and said that Szekeres might as well remain in the company of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Rakosi, and that he should keep himself away from Torgyan.

Finally, Pokorni had it out and said that Horn's report had been meaningless.

Horn called last year's news, according to which the West had been worried about a possible left-wing danger, a pack of lies. He informed Torgyan that 24 rather than 19 salvoes of cannonfire had been given, but the Smallholder leader could not have known about these as the noise had not carried all this way. He also said that it is not customary to give banquets, and he expressed his protest, saying that, even in the West, he is not in the habit of begging.

Russia Likely To Repay Debt in Combat Vehicles

LD1906202895 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 19 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Hungarian and Russian experts are likely to agree as early as this week on the repayment of another part of the Russian debt to Hungary. Defense Ministry spokesman Lajos Erdelyi said that Russia is expected to give infantry combat vehicles and parts valued at $300 million to the Hungarian land troops. The Russians currently owe Hungary $900 million.

National Assembly Reelects President Goncz

LD1906150395 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1436 GMT 19 Jun 95

[Report on presidential election proceedings in Hungarian National Assembly—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Speaker Zoltan Gal] I am now announcing that the election committee has completed its work. I call on the parliament's clerk to outline the results of the presidential election.

[Clerk] Esteemed National Assembly, the election committee has established that 349 deputies participated in the secret ballot. There was no incident that would have influenced the results of the election. The number of valid votes is 335, the number of invalid votes is 14.

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The number of votes cast in favor of President Arpad Goncz is 259. [long applause] The number of votes cast in favor of Mr. Ferenc Madl is 76. [brief applause]

[Gal] I establish that the secret ballot was valid and successful. The National Assembly has elected Arpad Goncz as president of the republic. [passage omitted]

Goncz Addresses Assembly

LD1906160195 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1440 GMT 19 Jun 95

[Speech by Hungarian President Arpad Goncz to National Assembly in Budapest, following his reelection—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Esteemed Mr. Speaker, esteemed National Assembly. [passage omitted] In the near future you will have to carry out the rationalization and modernization of the major redistribution systems, that is public education, health, and social insurance, and the reform of the state finances, which is an enormous workload. You will have to work at a rapid pace, amid tough debates, and not without mistakes either, for you will hardly have time to perfect all your decisions, but at least in a way that mistakes can be corrected [sentence as heard]. You will have to have at least as much respect for one another that you will always be able to place the country's interest above party interests. Remember, it is up to your wisdom whether a path can be constructed through the jungle of group interests and public interest.

It will also depend on you, whether in the 21st century Hungary will be a Hungarian country [Magyar Orszag] as well as a European one in the full political, cultural, and moral meaning of the word.

No less responsibility will rest upon the government, the executive power. It must consider its tasks with regard to long-term needs and accurately assess the possible political, social, and economic impact of every step.

From my post of head of state, I will give all the assistance I can to the National Assembly, the parties of the government coalition and the opposition, and the government of the Hungarian Republic. I believe that is how I can really serve the whole of the Hungarian people and the prosperity of all the citizens of our country, above all those who have no servants, for they are the ones who need help most of all. Thank you. [applause]

Horn: Reelection Very Important

LD1906193495 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1730 GMT 19 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Following the presidential election, Prime Minister Gyula Horn said that Arpad Goencz's reelection in the first round demonstrated that the government coalition parties are able to have good cooperation on major issues. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] According to the prime minister, by the president's reelection the government coalition parties have demonstrated that they are united on important matters. He hopes that the harmonious cooperation which has existed so far between the prime minister and the president of the Republic will continue.

[Begin Horn recording] This election result is very important from the aspect of the country's stability and the creation of a chance of national cooperation. Allow me to be, so to speak, patriotic in a positive sense. This is very important, because Hungary, yet again, has set a positive example in this matter, too. I mean that Hungary is almost the only country in Central and East Europe where relations between the president of the republic and the prime minister are harmonious. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Oppositionists React

LD1906180895 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 19 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Following the presidential election, three opposition parties held a joint news briefing. Geza Gecse reports.

[Gecse] The Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party [Fidesz-MPP], the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], and the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] have held a joint briefing.

Ferenc Madl evaluated today's presidential election by saying that the fact that three civic parties had managed to unite in putting up a joint candidate is of greater significance from the viewpoint of future than the result of the election itself.

According to MDF Chairman Lajos Fur, the decisive factor in today's result was the imbalance in parliamentary power relations. He said that the president's sphere of authority should not be increased in Hungary, and Ferenc Madl's political career has not ended with this decision.

Tamas Isepy, KDNP parliamentary floor group chairman, hoped that the new constitution will introduce direct presidential election.

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On behalf of the Fidesz-MPP, Jozsef Szajer thanked Ferenc Madl for accepting candidacy. He also said that this time Arpad Goncz received 30 less votes than five years ago, which means that the time when the president was elected with a consensus has ended.

APV RT Leaders Discuss Plans, Outlook

AU2006112595 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 15 Jun 95 p 5

[Interview with Sandor Puskas, director candidate of the Hungarian APV RT's supervisory committee, and Imre Szokai, chairman candidate of the APV RT's board of directors, by Sara Pogany on 14 June; place not given: "The APV Operates From 16 June"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] The National Assembly's Economic Committee heard from Sandor Puskas, nominee for director of the State Privatization and Asset Management Corporation [APV RT], on 14 June. He was followed immediately by Imre Szokai, nominee for chairman of the APV RT's board of directors. [passage omitted]

[Pogany] In your view, what will be the task of the APV RT's supervisory committee?

[Puskas] Members of the supervisory committee will not hold their first meeting until next week, so I can only talk about my own ideas. According to the new privatization law, the supervisory committee's basic tasks are to oversee the registration of assets and to maintain precise accounting of asset movements arising from the privatization processes. [passage omitted]

[Pogany] What will be the first tasks?

[Puskas] [Passage omitted] As is known, the law gives the APV RT's leadership 30 days to draw up the new statute, which will have to be submitted to the government. The new law also requires the APV RT to report both to the government and to the National Assembly. These reports also have to be approved by the supervisory committee. [passage omitted]

[Pogany] What kind of privatization practice do you wish to implement as chairman of the board of directors?

[Szokai] I wish to run a good privatization practice, which is clearly visible to the public and enjoys the widest possible social support. The latter is to include the whole of society, political parties, and interest groups. In addition to this, I will lay great emphasis on continuously supervising the privatizations and I will also treat asset management as a prominent area. In my work, I expect the support of the National Assembly's Economic, Budgetary, and Auditing Committees. [passage omitted]

[Pogany] In your view, will it be possible to achieve the planned 150 billion forints privatization income this year?

[Szokai] In my view, it is possible that this amount will come into the state treasury by the end of the year. I would add that, in the country's current difficult economic situation, I wish to direct privatization in such a way as to arrive at a modern and competitive economic structure and I also consider it important that privatization does not put domestic entrepreneurs, raw material producers, and suppliers into a worse position.

[Pogany] Are you planning to give 10 percent of the remaining state assets to people who are due compensation, as has been announced by Privatization Minister Tamas Suchman?

[Szokai] I consider this acceptable as a basis for negotiations; however, it is too early to go into detail, because the economic conditions will have to be carefully assessed first. [passage omitted]

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Silajdzic on Sarajevo Humanitarian Situation

LD1906204195 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 19 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The government of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina held a session today in connection with the current situation. Because of the present situation, our government is practically in permanent session. In an interview with our reporter [name indistinct], Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic said that the humanitarian situation is alarming:

[Begin recording] [Silajdzic] Information media usually speak about combat activities around Sarajevo and in the city of Sarajevo. They keep forgetting that ordinary people live in Sarajevo which has been under siege for 38 months. This is a genocidal measure which is aimed at putting pressure on the Bosnia-Herzegovina government to make some political concessions.

The fact is that every citizen of Sarajevo now gets 230 grams of bread plus nine grams of other food. This is below any minimum. The fact is that the bad water supply of our city increases the danger of infectious diseases; the hygienic and epidemiological situation is not satisfactory. We will therefore send a letter to the World Health Organization—this is one of the conclusions adopted by the government—in which we will announce such a possibility if this genocidal measure of turning off the water supply to the city of Sarajevo continues.

Further, as regards food, I belive that the city authorities will succeed in opening soup kitchens for approximately 2,200 people. We will ask the Red Cross to open up a kitchen, if possible, in Sarajevo because of the current situation. These are the two measures.

As for the situation in our medical institutions, we have also discussed that. For the time being, some reserves of medicines and medical equipment exist. I think that in this respect the situation is still tolerable. But if this situation continues, we will run out of medical equipment and medicines.

Another of the government's conclusions is to send a delegation to have talks with directors of these health institutions, in order to see what else we can do; as you may have heard, a certain quantity of fuel was supplied today to the main health institutions. We are hopeful this will be of some help. If there is anything that we can do, we will do so through this delegation which will visit health institutions. [passage omitted]

Finally, I would like to say that the government has decided to charge our UN mission to write a letter to the UN Security Council president, in which we would draw attention of the Security Council to the fact that for 38 [changes thought], which is frequently forgotten, that the city has been living under an old-fashioned, medieval siege for 38 months, that the siege is also a form of military engagement, that is, a hostile, aggressive, military engagement, and that this is being forgotten. [as heard]

The talk is of military activities around Sarajevo, and the fact is not mentioned that the siege of Sarajevo is a genocidal measure and that water is being cut off with the aim of spreading diseases, with the aim of gathering citizens to kill them, that killings like the one in the hospital a few days ago, the killing of patients in hospital beds represents a genocidal measure. [as heard]

So we remind the UN Security Council president, that is the world organization, the United Nations, that the genocidal measure of the siege of Sarajevo has been in place for 38 months and that not a single resolution of that Council, that is the Security Council, has been implemented.

They should bear this in mind when they speak about military offensives, that is, about military measures around Sarajevo.

[Reporter] Thank you very much. [end recording]

Sacirbegovic: UNPROFOR 'Irrelevant Factor'

AU1606203595 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 16 Jun 95

[Statement by Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic, place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Late last night, that is, early this morning, a resolution was passed that now [word indistinct] UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] with the so-called Rapid Reaction [word indistinct]. In a letter, we approved of the arrival of these new forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina and demanded [word indistinct] that they help UNPROFOR fulfill its mandate and [word indistinct] in conformity with our [words indistinct] and help [words indistinct]. Finally, I believe this resolution is the last chance for UNPROFOR [words indistinct] Bosnia-Herzegovina. If this has only been passed to help UNPROFOR troops defend themselves and they do not implement their mandate, then this means that UNPROFOR is becoming an irrelevant factor in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

We expressed our desire that UNPROFOR fulfills its mandate and [word indistinct] expectation that UNPROFOR will not become an irrelevant factor, even though our experience has taught us differently. Thus we said that although we wanted to expect the best, finally

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[words indistinct] UNPROFOR [words indistinct] fulfills its mandate, and for this [words indistinct].

I must add to all this that regardless of what is happening in New York, London, Paris, or Moscow, the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina will definitely be decided on the ground. I would like to repeat my sincere wish for the success of our army in Bosnia-Herzegovina and my sincere respect [words indistinct].

Ganic Assails UNPROFOR Activities

LD1906212795 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 19 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] By abolishing depots for the control of heavy artillery and releasing four Serb soldiers, the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] has in effect promoted terrorism. It did not protect its credibility, but obeyed all Karadzic's demands, Ejup Ganic, member of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency and vice president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, stated at a news conference with foreign journalists today.

Ganic said that in order to get its soldiers back, UNPROFOR surrendered heavy weapons to Karadzic's Serbs; the weapons are now being used for actions against Sarajevo. Some of these weapons are light tanks which used to belong to UNPROFOR units. On the other hand, four soldiers whom UNPROFOR handed over to the chetniks are from Serbia. A tacit agreement was reached that this should not be made public, but all the four soldiers whom UNPROFOR captured in fighting with the chetniks are citizens of Serbia, Ganic stressed. At the same time the presidency member recalled that UNPROFOR is not capable of fulfilling its mandate at present—to deliver humanitarian aid to the threatened population.

Asked whether UNPROFOR exists in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ganic replied: Of course it exists. We can feel it very well. For example, seven days ago a senior officer in charge of UNPROFOR logistics asked whether he could buy food from us. Now we have one more child to feed, Ganic said.

Commenting on a massacre that chetniks committed on a water line in Dobrinja, Ganic said: They are doing it all the time. Preventive actions by our army are directed at preventing new terrorist actions of the same nature. As the legitimate government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, we cannot and will not use such methods. We cannot commit massacre on a civilian population because we believe that the people on the other side are also citizens of this country irrespective of their political orientation. We will never use such methods, Ganic concluded.

Army, HVO Agree on More Joint Activities

AU1906190295 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 19 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Army General Rasim Delic, commander of the Bosnia-Herzegovina General Staff, and Brigadier General Mehmed Alagic, commander of the Bosnia-Herzegovina 7th Corps, held a meeting today with the representatives of the Croatian Defense Council General Staff—Major General Filip Filipovic, Major General Zivko Budimir, and Colonel Drago Dragicevic—in the presence of Kresimir Zubak, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation.

At the meeting, they confirmed the agreements reached at a joint meeting held in Travnik on 9 June. In connection with this, they agreed on even more concrete and intense joint combat activities against the Serbian-Montenegrin aggressor, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army press center reports.

POW's Rejecting Karadzic's 'Insane' Ideas

AU1906085595 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 19 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Press Center of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army has released a statement saying that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army has taken numerous aggressor troops prisoner in the recent fighting. All the captured aggressor troops have been accommodated in safe places. Rest, food, cigarettes, and other conditions have been provided to ensure that they overcome the situation in which they find themselves as easily as possible. The wounded are receiving the necessary medical aid and are surprised by our troops' decent behavior toward them. They themselves say that the death penalty introduced by Karadzic's regime will influence an increasing number of them to give themselves up in the future. It is an honorable act to distance oneself from the insane and unattainable ideas that are leading the Serbian people into endless conflicts, exhaustion, and unnecessary casualties.

The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army's objective is to liberate the occupied territories while maximally protecting not only the prisoners, but also the civilian population. All civilians who, owing to the fighting, have to leave the combat areas are guaranteed return to their homes, evacuation for women, children, and the elderly to areas outside those where Karadzic's regime has proclaimed a state of war. This is an important humanitarian task and it is the best possible way to protect the civilian population, reads a statement released by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army Press Center.

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Buha Urges U.S., FRG To Push for Talks

AU1906172095 Paris AFP in English 1610 GMT 19 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pale, Bosnia-Herzegovina, June 19 (AFP)—Bosnian Serbs urged Germany and the United States on Monday [19 June] to pressure the Bosnian Government to halt its four-day-old offensive and resume peace talks.

"We have to stop the war and negotiate, but for that the United States and Germany must put pressure on the Moslems," Aleksa Buha, "foreign minister" of the self-declared Serb Republic, told AFP.

He said continuation of the Bosnian Army offensive "would demonstrate that the international community has opted for a military solution to the Bosnian conflict."

"That solution would be the wrong one," he added, stressing that Washington and Bonn "must make the (Bosnian) Moslem leaders understand that they are not the masters of Bosnia."

He also criticised the planned deployment of a rapid reaction force to back up the beleaguered UN peacekeeping force, saying that it "will not help the situation, in fact it will make it worse."

The Bosnian Army launched its offensive early Friday in a bid to break the three-year siege of Sarajevo by Serb forces.

Krajisnik on Izetbegovic Cease-Fire Offer Motive

LD1906214395 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2135 GMT 19 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 19 (TANJUG)—The speaker of the Bosnian Serb Parliament Momcilo Krajisnik on Monday [19 June] told the BBC that Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic had offered a ceasefire merely to give a break to his troops because they were suffering heavy losses.

Izetbegovic on Sunday said he was ready for a ceasefire on the condition that the Serbs accept the Contact Group plan on Bosnia and put all their artillery under the control of the U.N. Protection Force.

The offer is not sincere and was probably made only under pressure from the United Nations, said Krajisnik.

He said the Contact Group plan had definitely been dropped as the Bosnian Serbs had voted against it at a referendum.

Speaking of the latest Muslim offensive launched on Thursday, Krajisnik said the Muslims had made no breakthroughs, and where they did have partial success, the Serbs had managed to recover their territory.

Krajisnik said the Serbs were preparing for a counteroffensive and added that the Serbs had no choice but to sit down for talks, or finally beat the Muslims.

He said the chief objective of the Serbs was not to conquer the Muslims. We want a lasting ceasefire, negotiations and demarcations, said Krajisnik.

Karadzic Adviser Condemns Latest Army Offensive

AU1906205695 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 16 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In today's public announcement, Jovan Zametica, advisor to President of the Republic Radovan Karadzic, emphasizes that the Muslim offensive on the Sarajevo area [passage indistinct] the international community's peace initiative. [passage indistinct] peace mediator and EU representative, Mr. Carl Bilt is prepared to, on the basis of [passage indistinct] and visit the war zone, Muslims are launching heavy [passage indistinct] and civilian targets, says Mr. Zametica.

Hospital reports indicate that over 50 percent of the casualties are civilians, that [passage indistinct] civilians in Hadzici, Ilidza, Ilijas, and other Serb parts of Sarajevo. All in all, the Muslim side has shown that it does not want a peaceful political solution to this conflict.

Considering the fact that the Muslim leadership has opted for the war, they will be defeated unless the international community reacts fast in order to put sense into the [word indistinct] and murderers, members of the fanatic Islamic [word indistinct], who are carrying out the orders of the regime in the Muslim part of Sarajevo.

The insane Muslim killers have been defeated by the Serb defenders on all the fronts. The number of the enemy victims is very high, and it is the evidence in blood of the insane intentions and [words indistinct] offensive, as well as the total blindness of the Muslim leaders towards the human price they are paying for the war they lost long ago.

Serb Civic Council: No Threat to Serbianhood

AU2006054995 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 19 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] After Pale proclaimed general mobilization and Nedjelko Prstojevic called on the Serbian people to take up arms, the Serbian Civic Council of Sarajevo today issued the following statement:

We, who are part of the people—the Serbian people who due to circumstances are under the heel of the Karadzic-Mladic junta—and who are being addressed by Nedeljko Prstojevic, persecutor of the Bosniaks and

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Croats from Ilidza, are convinced that his call for the defense of Serbianhood will not be accepted. It will not be accepted because Serbianhood and the Serbian people are not threatened by anyone. They are threatened by fascism, a policy of genocide, looting, evicting innocent people from their homes, and everything else that the morbid intellect of the self-proclaimed leader of the Bosnian Serbs, now alone with his like-minded people and followers, had planned. Along with them, the mouthpiece Prstojevic is also threatened, as the hand of justice is already closing on them.

What is happening these days poses no danger to the Serbs. It means danger to the culprits for the blockade of Sarajevo; the culprits for the casualties among Sarajevo residents, among whom are also some 50,000 to 60,000 Serbs dying daily from grenades and snipers; the culprits for the suffering of the innocent people, caused by cuts in the supply of electricity, which we generate ourselves, the supply of natural gas, which the aggressor does not pay for, water, and if they could, also they would have also cut off the air supply.

The international community remains more or less dumb to all this, apart from verbal condemnation and appeals. Butrus-Ghali would negotiate for 10 years to avoid war. [Word indistinct] the people of this region, all patriotic forces, and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, in which the Serbs, although less numerous, are nevertheless significantly included, the time has come to build a life fit for a man in the town. Sarajevo must receive a normal supply of food, water, and energy resources, accesses to the town must be opened and communications secured, we must preserve the territorial and urban integrity of the town, integrity entailing all its people—the Bosniaks, the Croats, the Jews, the Serbs, and all others who are called Sarajevans.

Prstojevic, who is flaunting Serbianhood, has overlooked one thing. Serbs have always lived in Sarajevo and Sarajevo, therefore, was Serbian and will continue to be so, however, only together and in harmony with the peoples with whom the Serbs have lived on this territory for centuries. More than 200,000 residents of the town have opted for such a Sarajevo [word indistinct].

The survival of the Serbian people is not brought into question. This is an opportunity for all Bosnian and Serbian people to turn toward democracy and future and tear themselves away from the quasi-historic rambling of the usurping leaders, who, for their own benefit, have reserved the darkest pages of history for them.

In April 1992 they pledged to enter in Sarajevo in seven days. Today, they are even less able to do so. More than 100,000 mobilized men have died so far. Do we need more, how long, and why, is written in a statement by the Serbian Civic Council.

Profile of Bosnian Serb Leader Radovan Karadzic

95BA0265D Zagreb HRVATSKI OBZOR in Serbo-Croatian 22 May 95 pp 32-33

[Article by Marko Barisic: "Radovan Karadzic: Criminal Father, Criminal Son"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *How will Radovan Karadzic—whose father was also tried for war crimes—react when camp survivors and raped women pass through the halls of justice: Will the mood change when those who saw the torture and execution of some of the 300,000 victims of the Serbian conquest come forward, or will he perhaps simply smile, convinced that he has achieved his boyhood dream? The answer to these questions will probably remain a secret for some time.*

If the International War Crimes Tribunal brings charges soon against the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Dr. Radovan Karadzic, it will be a precedent: the first time in history that a political leader is tried for crimes committed during a war of conquest. Another peculiar feature of Karadzic's case is the fact that he will be tried while he is still in office, which was not the case with the Nazis after World War II, who were tried only after military defeat.

Of course, Karadzic will probably not be present in The Hague, but there is no doubt that during the trial there will be a singular mood present at his presidential office in Pale. How will he react when camp survivors and raped women pass through the halls of justice: Will the mood change when those who saw the torture and execution of some of the 300,000 victims of the Serbian conquest come forward, or will he perhaps simply smile, convinced that he has achieved his boyhood dream? The answer to these questions will probably remain a secret for some time.

The dream of the child from Durmitor (Karadzic was born in 1945 in Petnica, near Savnik) was to be a poet or a hero. After four books of poems, many people realized that he had no talent, and after three years of war he has become an international criminal instead of a Serbian hero. But that is hardly likely to make him waver. He will continue to do his job, endeavoring to put an end to the remaining non-Serbs in the territory under his control, and thus far he has had no nightmares or insomnia. Of course, the trial in The Hague will deprive him of some of the comforts that he has enjoyed thus far: He will no longer be able to travel abroad, foreign delegations will not visit him in Pale, and the Serbs themselves will become aware

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that their president has an international arrest warrant out on him. But Karadzic will continue self-confidently, because he did not become a criminal through a whim, by mere chance, or because of his genetic disposition; he chose that "occupation" through common sense. That is because a madman, an unbalanced person, cannot work so systematically and consistently on the destruction, the extermination of other peoples. Such a project must be backed up by cold reason and an ideology that states that other nations simply cannot live in the territory that the Serbs have planned for their state. That is why some of them must be killed, some of them must be expelled, and the remainder will flee on their own. Karadzic has effected that plan, and that is why the court in The Hague has shown interest in what he has been doing over the past three years.

Raskovic's Mainstay

Those who know Karadzic from prewar Sarajevo contacts say that his new role surprised them. Specifically, he never gave anyone the impression that such a mechanism of evil was lurking inside him. He worked as a neuropsychiatrist, wrote poetry, associated with intellectual circles; the only thing that was a little strange was his frequent meetings with Dr. Jovan Raskovic, the now-deceased organizer of the Serbian rebellion in Croatia. But they thought that they were sharing professional experiences (they had the same vocation), and it never occurred to them that for many years after Tito's death the Greater Serbia program was being created at Raskovic's villa. According to later documents, Karadzic was one of Raskovic's mainstays and nothing was more natural than for him to assume the post of chairman of the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS] on the eve of the first multiparty elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was even said at the time that he belonged to the moderate wing of the SDS, compared to some of the "hawks," but it turned out that lurking behind the pretense of political moderation was a calculating mind that even then was devising the mechanism for destroying the non-Serb population. When he was joined by the military power of the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] after the popular referendum on Bosnia-Herzegovina independence, the bloody nuptials could begin. The world stood by aghast as, at the end of the 20th century, it saw massacres, camps, systematic rape, and swarms of refugees. This did not agitate Karadzic. In media appearances, he arrogantly denied everything, even accusing now the Muslims, now the Croats of filling pits with Serb corpses, of having camps. Carried away with the idea that he had become the leader of his people and that he was making history with his actions, he did not restrain himself in the least until he had subjugated 70 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It appears that this Serb messianism carried over to his family as well. His wife Ljiljana (also a neuropsychiatrist), whom he appointed president of the Red Cross for "the republic of Srpska," was charged by the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva with involvement in the "evacuation of refugees and camp detainees for pay." Because it was capable of doing so, it is no wonder that this sort of Red Cross concealed the secret of the camps, that it opposed the evacuation of wounded people from the eastern Bosnian Muslim enclaves, and that it did not make any noise about the blockade of water, electricity, and gas to the opposing side, which is a violation of international conventions. Besides his wife, his daughter Sonja too has a role in the government (media control), while his son Sasa is more inclined to a bon-vivant lifestyle and spends money collected from Croat and Muslim refugees all over Belgrade. In any event, Karadzic launched the Greater Serbia project together with his old friend Momcilo Krajisnik (the chairman of the so-called parliament), to whom he was linked by friendship and business cooperation from the prewar period. It was because of Krajisnik that Karadzic spent several months in prison because he (at the time the director of a construction company) was supposed to build him a house in Pale in exchange for a psychiatric analysis of people from his district. The police uncovered this scheme and today Karadzic says that he was tried and sent to prison for being anticommunist, and that he was framed by the "Muslim UDBA [State Security Administration]."

It is hard to fathom Karadzic's motives for initiating the creation of Greater Serbia in this manner. Even Milosevic, himself an originator of aggression, does not like the way in which Karadzic is eliminating the non-Serb population and would like to replace him with someone who is not marked by this syntagma of crime. Perhaps his Montenegrin origins engendered the need to be more of a Serb than the Serbs themselves, but it should be noted that it was in fact the chetniks from Montenegro who committed the worst crimes against the Muslim population in eastern Bosnia (Foca, Cajnice...) in World War II. Karadzic's father too was a chetnik who spent some time in prison after the war for the crimes that he committed, which explains his early parting of the ways with communism (he was thrown out of the League of Communists back in 1969). To this day, his system of governing is sustained most of all by noncommunists, especially the Serbian Orthodox Church. Still, in Serbia he is supported by all the circles that believe that all means should be applied to creating a Greater Serbia. In fact, in order to understand Karadzic and uncover his intentions, one must read the Greater Serbian ideologists, from Garasanin to Stevan Moljevic. From the latter he adopted the methods for how to do it,

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or rather how to complete that which the chetniks failed to do in World War II. Indeed, it must be noted that in his dealings with the Muslims and the destruction of religious structures, Karadzic is not a Serbian innovator. He is simply consistently doing in Bosnia the same thing that happened in Serbia in the last century during the liberation of Serbia from the Turks.

Division Between Orthodoxy and Islam

The fact that Karadzic is supported by some circles in Orthodox countries (Russia, Greece), that he is given literary awards ("Mikhail Sholokhov"), that Patriarch Pavle encourages him to continue his previous work, and that at the same time the court in The Hague is investigating him as a war criminal could be a sign of an even greater international division in relations between Orthodoxy and Islam. In other words, Orthodox countries will probably try to eliminate their Islamic populations. Bulgaria did so recently, Russia is doing so in Chechnya, Karadzic is doing so in Bosnia, and it should come as no surprise if he receives some other awards from those countries. Karadzic has simply been their test balloon, the model that they will adopt.

But the suspicions leveled against Karadzic could be a sign that he will not succeed in his aim. The military situation is no longer as much to his advantage as it was two years ago, nor is his political situation auspicious. His entire pseudostate is isolated and under sanctions, and after two years the first signs of a decline in morale and combat readiness are beginning to emerge among the Serbs. There have also been some military defeats that were inconceivable at the beginning of the war. Karadzic will have less and less cause for satisfaction, especially now that Milosevic has recognized that he is a serious rival for the Serbian throne.

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Serbs 'Return' to Krajina To Defend Region

AU2006081195 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 16 Jun 95 p 7

[Article by Dj. Djukic: "Krajina Residents Are Coming To Help"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Petrinja, 15 June—At its last session in Knin, the Serb Krajina Assembly decided to ask the authorities in Yugoslavia to help it with the mobilization of the able-bodied citizens who have left Krajina in the past few years. There are still no official figures on how this action is going, but the first indicators show that in contrast to earlier attempts, this action is fairly successful.

Convoys of buses full of conscripts are arriving in Krajina. They are coming to help their native region defend itself. Although there are different comments about this among the local population, one should say that the arrival of this help has been received with approval and that it has restored the shaken optimism in this region.

When the leaders of the regional military authorities referred at the aforementioned session to the possibility of the exiled Krajina citizens returning, saying that they would have the support of the Yugoslav authorities in that, this was received with a certain dose of skepticism, especially because such intentions in the past years did not yield any results. However, the initial results show that General Mile Mrksic, commander of the General Staff of the Army of Krajina, had many reasons for optimism when he spoke to the deputies about ways of strengthening the army. In this context, he also mentioned the return of those who went to the other side of the Drina River, and conveyed the promise of the Yugoslav authorities that they would help in this action.

The realization of the commander's promise has in many ways restored the faith that the promises concerning the reorganization of the army would also be realized, and that this reorganization would soon put the army in a full state of readiness for defense.

General Mrksic also spoke to the deputies about the "other side" of the conscripts' return, that is, the "welcome" for them. What he had in mind was that these people should not be met with criticism, insults, or unpleasant questions.

The people are most angry with those who have used this war to get rich and leave with a sizable capital following squabbles between Krajina and Yugoslavia. It was thought that they had secured their status (material, social), that they are untouchable, and that they would not find themselves in the situation of having to return. However, a large number of people have left for they did not see any future in Krajina. Many were troubled by the lack of organization, and often by hopelessness.

Daily Criticizes UN, West's Balkan Policies

AU1906105895 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 13 Jun 95 p 9

[Commentary by Ivkica Bacic: "Keepers of the Peace in a Period of War"]

[FBIS Translated Text] U.S. pilot Scott O'Grady was given a warm welcome at his squadron's base in Aviano, and an even warmer one in the United States. The international news agencies reported that his colleagues and family members, complete with family pets, had gathered in Aviano. That is very nice. Everyone is rejoicing in the happy ending of the young (29) marine's odyssey, and U.S. President Clinton is already announcing "a great movie" about the six-day struggle for survival in the woods south of Bihac.

For the big wide world, the prospect of this film makes everything else "Balkanesque" pale in comparison. Sarajevans have no water, electricity, natural gas, or bread; the airport in Butmir is closed; Karadzic's Serbs are still holding some 145 Blue Helmets and military observers, and they have once again "embraced" tanks, ammunition, and fuel from the UN arms depots as their own. Summed up, all this was enough for the United Nations understandably to revert back to the status quo ante, which means that the Blue Helmets in Bosnia-Herzegovina will continue to protect something that does not exist (peace) and they have to adhere "strictly" to this (from the Split meeting between Smith, Janvier, and Akashi). Understandably, they will be helped in protecting the nonexistent by the Rapid Reaction Force, which will protect the protection forces; they have to "revive" communications with the Pale Serbs, since it is quite understandable that the United Nations should, in its landmark year (50th anniversary), negotiate with terrorists.

The leader of the Bosnian Serbs has banned the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] from escorting humanitarian convoys for Sarajevo, and the encircled enclaves in eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Blue Helmets have understandably complied. In the future, the convoys will be escorted by the Serbian police instead of the Blue Helmets, while the UN High Commissioner for Refugees will keep the Blue Helmets informed on the traffic situation. This will, claim high-ranking UN officials, "make room for diplomacy." NATO defense ministers share this conviction; in Brussels they disclosed "the story of true success." That is what they called the mushrooming Partnership for Peace, which Russia has

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also joined—albeit not unconditionally—and which was enough for Defense Secretary Perry to state: "NATO is more than the currently topical Bosnia. We are building a new security structure in Europe."

It is, therefore, quite understandable for Russia and the West until recently to be sacrificing at the altar of Europe's "secure environment" Croatia (they are still sacrificing it to a certain degree) and Bosnia now and in the future. The Serbian terrorists in Pale do not have to sacrifice anything: By capturing the Blue Helmets they avoided "warning" air strikes, after which their mentors in Belgrade send them a few more arms and fuel for the "release" of part of the Blue Helmets. What, then, is the reason for the Blue Helmets to stay? They cannot keep the peace because there is no peace, and there is no peace because there is no effective form of pressure on the Serbs—a year has gone by since the Contact Group plan was proposed, allegedly as an ultimatum, and they cannot deliver humanitarian aid because the Serbs will not allow them to.

Is there any end to the American babbling and the European stumbling in Bosnia and Croatia? Clinton's latest stance is that Serbian expansionism is "unstoppable" because "they have been fighting there for a thousand years," yet only yesterday he was swearing that "the United States will never again allow the strangulation of Sarajevo." Chirac was saying a week ago that "France will not tolerate a return to barbarianism in Europe," after which he telephoned Milosevic and asked him to "mediate" in the release of the hostages. Owen's successor, Carl Bildt, believes "that you cannot change the last 300 years of Balkan history, nor the events of three years ago." He also said that he would "build on what has already happened," therefore, he implicitly acknowledges the results of Serbian aggression and genocide.

What then is left for the victims of aggression—Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina? First, they have to free themselves of the illusion that the arms embargo (which is increasingly becoming an instrument of genocide, as Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic keeps saying in vain) will be lifted—when Congress demands it, Clinton says "No"; if Clinton were to demand it, Congress would oppose it, which is business as usual in preelection America. Second, they should remember German Chancellor Bismarck, whose advice the West has been following for the past five years: "The Balkans are not worth the kneecap of a single one of my soldiers." Third, close joint defense against Serbian fascism. The next action need not be called Flash. Its success will suffice.

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Assembly Speaker Andov Views Regional Conflict

AU2006104695 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 14 Jun 95 p 8

[Interview with FYROM Assembly Chairman Stojan Andov by Valeri Zapryanov and Lyubcho Neshkov; place and date not given: "We Do Not Hide Anything From Our Readers"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [STANDART NEWS] You are known in Bulgaria as a pragmatic politician with an Atlantic orientation. Do you think that Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] is ready for complete integration into the European political arena?

[Andov] I do not know how well the Bulgarian public knows me or to what extent it is aware of my activities and convictions. However, I must admit that you assess my activities and convictions in a very precise and correct manner.

[STANDART NEWS] In other words, our newspaper is precise.

[Andov] Yes, absolutely. I must tell you that Macedonia is closely following the European process. There is no dispute in our country on whether we should have an European and, I stress, an Atlantic orientation. I see no serious political formation that could oppose this. There are certain ethnic parties that claim that they do not accept such a line. I think that the population, regardless of people's ethnic origin, supports this line. For us joining European structures is not a matter of fashion. Membership of these structures allows us the possibility of achieving European standards, protecting citizens' rights and freedom, achieving economic progress, and giving hope to present and future generations.

[STANDART NEWS] Do European leaders know Macedonia well?

[Andov] This question was more topical at the time we declared our independence. Do European leaders know enough about Macedonia? Would they support us? Would we receive from them what we are asking for? Naturally, we have had certain difficulties. However, our moves to preserve peace in the region, the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army without any conflict, avoiding ethnic conflict, and the fact that we have good relations with all our neighbors, have no territorial claims on any of them, and have accepted UN troops on our territory—all this has stimulated a greater interest in Macedonia, a better knowledge, and—I must admit—greater support. Now we have no difficulties in explaining our moves. Although there are certain conflicts, such as the one with Greece, we are encountering understanding.

[STANDART NEWS] Do you think that there is a danger of the war spreading?

[Andov] I think that declaring the independence of the Republic of Macedonia and the policy of peace and understanding that we are conducting were of decisive importance for peace in the region and in the Balkans. There were periods when no one believed that we would preserve peace, that there would be no intervention on the part of the Yugoslav Army, and that there would be no ethnic conflict, principally between the Albanians and the Macedonians. If all this had happened because of someone's desire to serve foreign interests, all our neighbors would have suffered. There would have been a much bloodier war with much more unpredictable consequences than the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It would have been a real tragedy for the Albanians and Macedonians. I think that Macedonia's independence and its policy have a special importance for the region's stability. This has been understood by all European and world institutions. I think that we are beyond the most dangerous point, but this does not mean that no dangers lie ahead.

[STANDART NEWS] Stalin once said that the small countries must choose between this or that world power. At present there is a great dispute in Bulgaria over NATO membership. Do you have such a problem?

[Andov] No, we do not have such a dispute.

[STANDART NEWS] Please describe Macedonia's attitude toward its neighbors, principally Bulgaria, without using the principle of equal distance.

[Andov] Our policy aims at good neighborly relations. We extend our hand to all our neighbors and we are occasionally prepared to swallow an insult in the name of preserving good relations. We shall continue our policy of equal readiness to cooperate with all four of our neighbors.

As far as the Republic of Bulgaria is concerned, I would like to point out that your country was the first to recognize the independence of the Republic of Macedonia. I think that our interstate relations got off to a good start. I may be wrong, but I have the impression that official contacts have now became rare. Bulgaria and Macedonia have no interest in creating stagnation or a vacuum in their relations. We must do everything to promote bilateral cooperation. We should not allow internal political causes or the burden of the past to prevent our civilized cohabitation. [passage omitted]

[STANDART NEWS] Could you be more specific about the problems that hinder our relations?

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[Andov] First of all, the dispute as to whether our language should be called Macedonian or the official language. I do not know what caused this dispute. I know that a language is called what the people who use it want to call it. In addition, there are the problems with Greece and our country's name. Many Western politicians have told us that, were this not a problem between states, they would laugh. [passage omitted]

Gligorov, Cvitan Conclude Talks on FRY

AU2006080795 Skopje MIC in English 19 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] "Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and Croatia have similar viewpoints on all issues related to the situation in former Yugoslavia, and they feel particularly strong on the issue that the insistence of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] to be the sole successor of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [SFRY] is unacceptable." This was concluded at the talks between the President of the Republic of Macedonia Kiro Gligorov and the Croatian ambassador to Macedonia Onesin Cvitan.

HINA reports that in yesterday's talks, Gligorov assessed that Croatia "has shown strength and a chance to get its territory back," and that "it is untenable for them to have occupied territories and that can't last for years."

In the talks, both sides positively assessed the arrival of the forces for quick intervention [Rapid Reaction Forces] in Bosnia.

An eventual lifting of the arms embargo could bring about an expansion of the war for the government in Sarajevo, the Macedonian President and the Croatian ambassador assessed.

HINA adds that Kiro Gligorov sent out an invitation to his Croatian counterpart Franjo Tudjman to visit Macedonia.

Denmark's Petersen Urges Greece To Lift Embargo

AU2006082095 Skopje MIC in English 19 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] "My country feels that Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] has the right to be a member of the OSCE [Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe] and will continue giving strong support for its membership in this organization and the Council of Europe," the Danish Foreign Minister Nils Petersen stated during his visit to Macedonia and the talks with Macedonia's Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski.

He expressed hope that the problems with Greece would be settled in a satisfactory way, which, according to him, is of great importance for the region, however, Greece should lift the embargo which Denmark has condemned as unfair from the very start, Petersen said.

In assessing the talks with Petersen, the Macedonian Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski said that they discussed Denmark's to-date support of the accession of Macedonia to the international community and the ways of stimulating the economic cooperation. They also initiated the signing of agreements, for guaranteeing investments, avoiding double-taxation, which, according to the Macedonian minister, should create a favorable climate for the investors.

Rehabilitation of Banks, Hard-Currency Accounts

95P20808A Belgrade EKONOMSKA POLITIKA (supplement) in English 15 May 95 p 11

[Article by V. Grlickov: "Macedonia: Rehabilitation of Banks"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Reforms planned in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] through arrangements with IMF and the World Bank, were started by the banks. Rehabilitation of the complete banking system has been started in two ways: by linear measures referring to all banks, and by individual procedures for the Stopanska banka (the largest bank in Macedonia and so far the one most dependent on the state) and the National bank. Bankruptcy procedure has begun for only one bank: the Bank of foreign trade.

Linear rehabilitation measures include cleaning bank balance from obligations and charges on the basis of frozen foreign currency savings and from liabilities towards the Paris club of creditors (loans approved by foreign governments and governmental organizations). The active portion of the balance is also freed from charges from local companies based on countervalue of foreign credits within the Paris club. The banks' charges will be transferred to the Rehabilitation Agency which will take care of collection from end users. The banks' balances will be freed from old foreign currency savings by transferring obligations and charges on the basis of out-of-balance records. From 1 January 1995, frozen savings have become liability of the state. Their servicing, according to legal solutions, will be provided from the budget and implemented through business banks. Recording and servicing of frozen savings will technically be performed by business banks on behalf of the budget.

Cleaning of each bank's balance from old foreign currency savings accounts will be done at the expense of tax payers, who will be burdened with one billion

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dollars for this purpose. The budget will cover 50 percent of overtaken obligations towards the Paris club of creditors, and the other half will be covered by enterprises, burdening tax payers with an additional 185 million dollars.

Individual rehabilitation has begun only for Stopanska banka which has got enough clients for profitable operation. Freeing the balance from bad denar items will burden tax payers with seven billion denars (175 million dollars).

Stopanska banka was chosen for individual rehabilitation because state interventions have mostly been realized through it. The extent is illustrated by the fact that in total selective credits, Stopanska banka participates with 96 percent, meaning that they could not decide on their placement policy independently. Bad denar payments will be transferred to the Rehabilitation Agency. In return, the bank will be given state securities bearing the interest rate equal to the discount rate of the National bank.

Stopanska banka will also have to pay a portion of the bill, because bad placement will partly be covered by capitals owned by serious net debtors, along with corresponding reserves of the bank.

Simultaneously with the balance cleaning, the process of reorganization starts. Branches of Stopanska banka may separate (one or more) and establish independent banks, provided that no less than 51 percent of the capital be in private hands.

A branch wishing to separate must also fulfill the following conditions: a clean balance with fully identified shareholders' capital, the capital bigger than nine million German marks in denars, overall active part of the balance no smaller than 40 million marks in denars, liquidity, solvency, positive flow of cash input and output of resources, high quality management, readiness and capability of attracting additional capital in the first year of independent operation. Also, it must not be in a position to monopolize the region.

Throughout the process of reconstruction of the Stopanska banka, until completion, the managing board of the bank will include two representatives of the government and one representative of the National Bank of Macedonia. Together with the managerial team of Stopanska banka, they are supposed to arrange conditions for efficient operation of the bank until privatization. With privatization, membership of external representatives in the managing board will cease.

A sure sign of real change, a sign that time has come when everyone must bear his portion of risk, is the bankruptcy procedure started against the Bank of foreign trade. It was estimated that this bank has no future, so tax payers money must not be spent on it. Bankruptcy need not necessarily mean that the bank will be closed down. If parties interested in covering the losses and overtaking the bank are found, the Bank of foreign trade may be saved without any further cost for the tax payers.

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Foreign Minister on Policies, Russia, U.S.

WS2006104595 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 17-18 Jun 95 pp 1, 6-7

[Interview with Foreign Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski by Krystyna Szelestowska and Zygmunt Slomkowski; place and date not given: "The Minister's 100 Days"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [TRYBUNA] You stated in your speech in the Sejm that there would be only one policy of the Polish Republic. You said that there would not be two separate policies—an Eastern and a Western one. How do you understand this?

[Bartoszewski] Let me begin by recalling that early in my term of office as head of the Foreign Affairs Ministry [MSZ], I held serious, nonroutine talks with ministers of the United States, Germany, Russia, and the Czech Republic. This shows that I treat this single policy as a real thing, not merely as a slogan. [passage omitted]

It is, to a certain extent, anachronistic to split policies between East and West; it corresponds to the old Polish way of thinking, in line with which Poland is between Russia and Germany. This was historically justified, but history is just history, and building the future cannot be based on it.

[TRYBUNA] Right now the split is artificial....

[Bartoszewski] Yes, it is. Transformations are in the interests of the entire world, not only of East and Central Europe. Successes in the process of democratization or introduction of market mechanisms—no matter whether they are achieved in St. Petersburg or in Warsaw—are successes of all Europe; failures and mistakes complicate the situation in all of Europe. The same goes for integration with EU and NATO —this also lies in the interests of Europe in its entirety. This process is not against anyone's interests; it only serves the cause of building one Europe on verified democratic principles. It is on these principles that our country wants to base its relations with all the countries east and west of Poland.

I would not like to introduce any personal elements here; however, I am probably the only foreign minister in the world who remembers well the Munich Treaty, treaties on nonaggression with Hitler and Stalin, pacts on friendship with France and Great Britain, and then Poland's fate after 1939 and the response of Western countries. This historical awareness is here when I assess phenomena and statements. Therefore, I would never make any exotic alliances, that is, alliances that are far from reality. [passage omitted]

[TRYBUNA] Our policy toward the West is clear, which cannot be said about the East. Your predecessor in office, Minister Olechowski, made certain efforts in this area. However, they were not very fruitful. Talks between the presidents were removed from agendas of meetings; [Russian Foreign] Minister Kozyrev's official visit has not been held. Do we have a vision of our relations with Russia?

[Bartoszewski] The Polish-Russian dialogue is still maintained on a rather high level—such as the level of directors of departments. However, there are not enough spectacular elements to this dialogue—first of all meetings of the heads of both states. I do not think that the commemoration of the Katyn anniversary is a good occasion to hold political talks. I do believe, however, that this government certainly has sent clear signals, such as my talk with Minister Kozyrev in Paris (on 20 March). Both ministries positively evaluate the atmosphere at those meetings, as well as the atmosphere that surrounded them. This represents quite a lot in diplomatic language.

I believe that there is mutual respect between Minister Kozyrev and myself. During recent talks in Gdansk a few sentences were enough for Minister Kozyrev to give up the idea of bringing up any controversial issues suggested by some Russian and Polish newspapers. Minister Kozyrev is a diplomat who is very responsible; therefore, when he and I spoke with reporters, he would not have hesitated to say that he was not fully satisfied with the talks with the head of the Polish MSZ—if he really had seen it that way. I, in turn, declared my readiness for a longer conversation at any time—either in Warsaw or in Moscow. The response was favorable. Now a concrete date must be set.

Let me add that the invitation for President Yeltsin to visit is still valid; the only problem is that he is now busy trying to solve a number of problems, and in our country the Polish president is also quite preoccupied. It must be emphasized, however, that development of our economic relations does not depend on political moods. When Poland unequivocally articulated its desire to join NATO and EU, Russia's stand evidently became more adamant. At the same time, however, we saw that our economic cooperation was clearly intensifying. For example, in 1994 we overcame the deadlock that emerged after introduction of settlements in hard currency.

Thus, politics and economics should not be linked with each other too primitively. This linking process is an element of the magic way of thinking, in line with the fear Moscow will "punish" us if we do not listen to it. I do not think that such a serious state would like to administer economic "punishment" to anyone; I do

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not think that we should think about it in these terms. [passage omitted]

[TRYBUNA] For quite different reasons and as a result of a different way of thinking, Poles do not fully understand the consequences of Poland's integration with EU and NATO. Can we speak about a national strategy in the integration process? Does anyone intend to tell the people about the difficulties and even barricades that we must overcome along this road, as well as the costs of the entire operation before we all reap appreciable benefits from it?

[Bartoszewski] I spoke about this need in my speech to the Sejm. The outline of this strategy was presented by Prime Minister Oleksy in Brussels. Individual ministries are already analyzing the social implications of our membership in these structures. Great steps have already been taken toward adjusting our legislature to that of the EU's. We will have to hold a public debate on these issues. Mass media should bring up these issues every day. I witnessed such activities in Vienna. Approximately 40 percent of nonentertainment programs on television and on radio in the months preceding the referendum on Austria's integration with the EU were devoted to these subjects.

As for NATO, a plan for preparing the Polish Armed Forces for membership in this organization is very important. This, however, is not an entirely open issue anywhere in the world. However, there is a test of readiness to respect one's commitments resulting from the Washington Treaty, as well as a test of one's ability to enhance the security of all NATO. There is also a serious problem of costs and deadlines.

[TRYBUNA] While we are talking about the West, another question emerges: How should we look upon certain facts which are interpreted by many people as an act of outside intervention in our internal affairs? I am now talking about the letter from U.S. Ambassador Rey which defended a U.S. company; the letter was a form of exerting pressure on our legislators. Do we act similarly abroad?

[Bartoszewski] Let me ask a question as well: Does the fact that we give medals and honors to U.S. Republican Senator Brown, who is in opposition to President Clinton's administration, represent intervention in that country's foreign affairs? Well, after all, he wants to force an amendment which is favorable to us, but he is doing this against the wishes of the White House. Now, as far as that letter is concerned, we believe that there is nothing bad about direct contacts between ambassadors in Warsaw and government agencies—on the condition that the same principles are applied in the case of our ambassadors in other countries. In Washington these principles are applied and our ambassador is in touch not only with ministers and government and state agencies, but also with the Congress as a whole and with individual commissions.

[TRYBUNA] Did Ambassador Rey not go against good etiquette when he included certain threats relating to NATO in his letter?

[Bartoszewski] The issue of this letter is outside of MSZ; aside from that, there is a diplomatic custom which obliges me to refrain from commenting on statements by an ambassador representing a friendly country.

Let me add that efforts made by our embassy in Washington and support from the Congress of Polish-Americans have certainly contributed to the fact that the United States changed its stand on NATO expansion to the Visegrad Group countries; Polish diplomats have often made interventions—they defended the interests of Polish firms, and this is how the concern of the U.S. ambassador should be interpreted. He simply wanted the Polish Administration to respect the agreements it had reached with foreign interests.

[TRYBUNA] Does this apply to arms exports as well? Due to pressure from the United States, among others, our industry is falling and people are out of jobs...

[Bartoszewski] The foreign services that are under the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation should be engaged in activities aimed at finding new markets for Polish military products, as well as to develop legal contacts that would make such exports possible. It is necessary, however, to subordinate these activities to the most important goals of the state's security policy.

[TRYBUNA] Let us return to our own backyard, to MSZ. Over the 100 days that you have been minister, you have recalled ambassadors and presented a few new candidates. What personnel policy are you going to pursue in MSZ?

[Bartoszewski] Some people, including those in the coalition, do not want or are unable to understand my requirements. However, soon everyone will have a chance to see for themselves that I am promoting well-prepared people and recalling those who are least fit for this kind of work.

[TRYBUNA] You have been minister for 100 days. This is a short time. Can you say, however, with what you are satisfied and with what you are not?

[Bartoszewski] I believe that the most important things that have happened were my visits to Washington, Bonn, and Jerusalem, as well as considerable acceptance

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that this minister earned for himself and for his policies in many countries in the world. Yes, acceptance is the right word here, because it serves our nation. It is my task to win people over to Poland's policies. Now, it is an important and difficult task to persuade people to accept policies of a state whose economic stability is pretty good, but whose political stability raises some doubts. To my surprise, my record plays an important role here.

This is important to our country, not to me, because, due to my age, this is the last mission in my life and I am free of all aspirations—except from one: I want to serve the country well when I am carrying out this mission.

[TRYBUNA] How long are you going to perform this mission?

[Bartoszewski] I will be in the government as long as I am able to efficiently carry out the tasks specified by the prime minister in his speech on 3 March. Of course, other opinions and activities of the governing or opposition parties are of interest to me, but they do not determine my activities. They are an element of information.

However, I want to stress that Poland must speak with one voice on foreign affairs issues. Let us look at how others are doing this, such as the British, Germans, or the French. And let us learn from them.

NATO Expansion, Relations With Russia Viewed

95EP0128A Warsaw WARSAW VOICE in English 21 May 95 p 7

[Article by Juliusz Urbanowicz: "The Nagging Doubts About NATO"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Fifty years after World War II, Poland is afraid of again becoming a pawn in a power game played by the world's leading nations.

"The powers of this world have forgotten Poland's contribution to the victory over fascism," said Polish Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy, after the 50th anniversary celebrations held in Moscow to mark the end of World War II.

The lack of interest in Poland's situation was noted by the Polish delegation. "The word 'Poland' was only mentioned once in the talks between presidents Yeltsin and Clinton. We should draw certain conclusions from this and evaluate Poland's position more realistically," commented Andrezej Zakrzewski, secretary of state at the President's Chancellery.

Both Polish representatives said they tried to remind people of Poland's drive to overthrow fascism and of their country's present aspirations during their meetings with politicians from various countries in the Russian capital. Fifty-two national delegations attended the celebration.

In his speech, U.S. President Bill Clinton said, "Just as Russians and Americans fought together 50 years ago against a common evil, so today we must fight for the common good." However, in a short meeting with Clinton, the Polish prime minister recalled promises Clinton made during his visit to Warsaw last year. Oleksy refused to disclose the subject of the promises but did say they had not been kept. "It could be embarrassing if I disclosed them, because I had the impression the president had forgotten about them," he said.

Although the issue of extending NATO was discussed during the Russian-American summit, no decisions were made. "Welcomes, farewells, lunches, receptions, openings and closings—it's not surprising there was no time for such a small matter as NATO," said Zakrzewski.

The Russians did agree to join the Partnership for Peace program. Initially they had agreed to join the program of cooperation between the former Warsaw Pact states and NATO, but changed their minds in December 1994 after NATO expressed its intention of expanding eastward. Russia will join the Partnership for Peace in May 1995. In exchange, Clinton said Russia would have a special status in relations with NATO.

Many observers in American political circles believe that during the Moscow summit the most important thing for the United States was not the expansion of NATO, the revision of the 1990 agreement to reduce conventional arms (CFE) or the Russian nuclear reactor supplies going to Iran. Instead the United States pushed for ratification of the START II treaty to reduce nuclear weapons, which was signed in 1993. In exchange for American concessions in other areas, Russian President Boris Yeltsin promised to put pressure on the Russian parliament to ratify the treaty this year. The ratification would reduce the Russian arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons by almost three-fourths and practically eliminate the possibility of a first strike against the United States by Russia.

Russia continued to resist the expansion of NATO. During a press conference after the meeting with Clinton, Yeltsin said that the extension of NATO dominated the discussion. The Russian president expressed his hope that Russia and the United States would agree to a joint position on this matter in October 1995, during the United Nations' 50th anniversary celebrations in New York.

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The leaders of Ukraine and Belarus disagreed over the expansion of NATO. Belarus President Aleksandr Lukashenko also told Oleksy that Belarus was concerned about NATO being extended to its borders.

On the other hand, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma welcomed the idea. "NATO is a stabilizing factor in Europe," he said during Clinton's visit to Kiev on his return from Moscow. Kuchma supported NATO's evolutionary process of extension.

Although the extension of NATO remains a bone of contention in Polish-Russian relations, Oleksy's visit brought about a warming. "I'm sure there will be no tension between our countries," said Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin after talking to his Polish counterpart. "Everything is in favor of us getting along well in goodneighborly relations." During their meeting they debated the implementation of previously concluded bilateral agreements and the development of relations between the two countries. Poland and Russia intend to resume military and technical cooperation.

"It was necessary to go [to Moscow] on account of Poland's contribution to the victory over fascism and because we need to be in places where we want to have good relations and cooperation in future," said Oleksy.

Justice Minister Vows To Monitor Wiretapping

WS1906133695 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 19 Jun 95 p 2

[Article by "LUZ": "From Now on Surveillance Will Be Conducted Only With Minister Jaskiernia's Knowledge"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] On yesterday's "100 Questions to..." program on television, [Justice Minister] Jerzy Jaskiernia announced he would alter decisions made by his predecessor. "Effective Monday, I will closely examine all applications [to begin wiretapping operations]," he promised.

Politicians claim that the previous situation posed certain dangers. "Primarily, military circles were free to decide about wiretapping operations. Secondly, the Office of State Protection [UOP] could in fact conduct wiretapping operations against anyone it wanted, beyond any control of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]," says one of the politicians from that party.

Jerzy Dziewulski (also from SLD), deputy chairman of the Sejm Defense Commission, sees wiretapping conducted by the Military Inelligence Services [WSI] as the main threat. "To commence wiretapping, UOP must first institute preparatory proceedings and have serious suspicions. I would therefore not fear any malfeasance. The situation is dangerous as far as WSI is concerned because it cannot institute preparatory proceedings and thus enjoys greater freedom," claims Dziewulski.

Not only the prosecutor general, but the parliament as well, had no knowledge of who was being wiretapped. A special Sejm commission for the secret services will be formed to oversee the efficiency of wiretapping conducted by UOP and WSI. It should be established before the summer holiday season.

Prosecutor Not To Investigate

WS2006105695 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 20 Jun 95 p 2

[Report by "PW": "The Personnel Carrier Sales: Wiretapping Was Legal?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Contrary to statements issued by the National Security Office and press reports, the Military Prosecutor's Office does not intend to deal with the issue of the telephone conversation between General Tadeusz Wileck, head of General Staff, and General Gromoslaw Czempinski, head of the Office of State Protection, that was wiretapped by the military counterintelligence services. The whole affair was made public by former Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk in connection with the sales of [BMp-2] carriers. "Neither Wilecki nor Czempinski filed a complaint," Colonel Wlodzimierz Pospiech, spokesman of the Military Prosecutor General's Office, told GAZETA WYBORCZA on 19 June. The Prosecutor's Office will not open an investigation of its own initiative.

"If the information was obtained in the course of counterintelligence operations and such operations are customarily carried out in the course of such sessions, it means that everyone knew of the wiretapping and gave their silent consent," says Col. Pospiech.

Government Opposes Confrontation With Unions

LD1906165495 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1400 GMT 19 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Government press spokeswoman Aleksandra Jakubowska has said that it is not the cabinet's intention to get involved in a confrontation with any political or trade union organization active in Poland. Last week Solidarity Chairman Marian Krzaklewski said that the authorities have such intentions with regard to his union. According to Aleksandra Jakubowska, the government is maintaining continuous contact with the trade unions.

[Begin Jakubowska recording] High-level activists from the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarity took active part in the meeting with the prime minister in Warsaw on 2 June. Mr. Marian Kepski, the union deputy

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leader, received an invitation to a meeting with the prime minister in Katowice where the issue of contracts for Katowice Voivodship was discussed. Unfortunately he did not take up the invitation.

On many occasions the prime minister declared his readiness to have personal meetings with all union leaders. This includes Mr. Marian Krzaklewski. However, goodwill on both sides is needed for such a meeting to take place. So far, Mr. Marian Krzaklewski has not shown such goodwill.

Most union demands are being met. Talks are being held on the fulfillment of other demands. This was discussed during the course of deliberations of the Tripartite Commission [government, unions, and employers] where the Solidarity activists were present. The prime minister spoke about that in his Sejm address. [end recording]

Daily Reports Conflict in President's Entourage

WS2006133895 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 20 Jun 95 p 2

[Article by Kazimierz Groblewski: "President's Chancellery: Conflict Between Kwiatkowski and Wachowski Continues; Personnel Office Director and Crashed Cars"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Presidential Chancellery Head Tomasz Kwiatkowski is trying to recall Miroslaw Michalski, head of the Office of Personnel and Distinctions. The reason for such action is the fact that Michalski has been involved in car accidents three times already, and each time he was driving an official vehicle. Michalski is a nominated official and Kwiatkowski cannot recall him immediately. [passage omitted]

As the head of the Personnel Office, Miroslaw Michalski was until recently under Presidential Office Head Mieczyslaw Wachowski. For a couple of weeks now, his superior has been Presidential Chancellery Head Tomasz Kwiatkowski. In line with our information, the attempt to recall Michalski is yet another dispute between Kwiatkowski and Wachowski. It is worth recalling that so far Wachowski has lost authority over two offices to Kwiatkowski: the Office of Personnel and Distinctions and the Office of the President's Organizational Services. Recently, Wachowski did not approve of the idea of organizing a meeting of the "Now Poland" emblem chapter, which was proposed by Kwiatkowski. One of the Chancellery officials believes that this decision, as well as the difficulties in recalling the head of the Personnel Office, mean that Minister of State Mieczyslaw Wachowski has now launched an attack in his conflict with Under Secretary of State Tomasz Kwiatkowski. So far, persons who came into conflict with Wachowski have sooner or later left the Chancellery.

Sejm Deputies Attend Bundestag Session

MM1906083295 Opole NOWA TRYBUNA OPOLSKA in Polish 6 Jun 95 p 3

[Article by "WAW": "Resentment Should Be Put to Rest: Chancellor Kohl Will Not Visit Opole Region"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Last Thursday [1 June] the Bundestag held a debate on the German expellees [from former German territories after World War II] and their subsequent contribution to the creation of a democratic system in Germany. Polish Sejm Deputy Henryk Kroll and Senator Gerhard Bartodziej attended the debate in the capacity of observers. During their stay in Bonn, the Polish guests also discussed the plans for German politicians to visits the Opole region in the near future.

"We were hoping to persuade Chancellor Kohl to come to Silesia during his forthcoming visit to Poland in July," Deputy Kroll, chairman of the Social-Cultural Association for Germans in Opole Silesia, told us. "We talked about this with the director of the Chancellor's office, who handles preparations connected with the Chancellor's official visits. He argued that Chancellor Kohl will be spending only two days and several hours in Poland, and that that amount of time is insufficient to fit in a visit in response to our invitation. By way of compensation, we were given the assurance that Theo Waigel, German finance minister and CSU [Christian Social Union] chairman, would visit our region on 11 July, accompanied by a group of politicians representing his party."

Our members of parliament, who represent the German minority of the Opole region, listened to the Bundestag debate from the seats reserved for distinguished visitors. They came away very much impressed, both as Germans and as Polish citizens, with what they had heard.

"The debate was most constructive," Deputy Kroll said. "We heard repeated assurances of an absence of resentment against Poland, not only from Chancellor Kohl, but also from other speakers. The recent address delivered before the Bundestag by [Polish Foreign] Minister Bartoszewski was also remembered positively. The speakers recalled a fact which is nowadays not often remembered in Poland: that the first conciliatory gesture, in the form of the Expellees' Charter—in which the expellees renounced all acts of revenge and all demands for retribution against those responsible for their plight—was made as early as 1950. I believe that it is actually Polish politicians rather than the Germans who keep a sense of resentment against that

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particular historical fact alive and 'simmering' in their consciousness. The latter have come to terms with reality a long time ago. In my opinion, the expellees' circles could be put to good use: They can contribute to the creation of good Polish-German neighborly relations, especially as their members themselves are only too eager to help build such relations."

Krzaklewski, Glemp Discuss Social Issues

LD2006102295 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0922 GMT 20 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 20 Jun—Cardinal Jozef Glemp, primate of Poland, on 20 June received Marian Krzaklewski, chairman of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union [NSZZ] Solidarity, the primate's office announced in a communique for PAP.

The Solidarity chairman briefed the primate on the results of the 7th national congress of Solidarity delegates. He stressed that the congress resolutions were based on Catholic social teaching, and that the congress expressed this by including the pope's teaching on family rights in the congress's programmatic resolution. He also told the primate about the union's attitude toward the World Conference of Women in Beijing and about methods of introducing ownership transformations [in Poland] which are giving cause for concern.

The social situation in the homeland was also discussed and concern voiced over the directions of work on a draft constitution.

The Solidarity chairman invited the primate to take part in ceremonies marking the 15th anniversary of the union, the communique says.

Episcopate Criticizes Sejm Constitutional Draft

WS1906121295 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 19 Jun 95 p 3

[Article by "ARD, KAI": "The Current Draft of the Constitution Is Unacceptable, Says Archbishop Jozef Michalik; Immoral Constitution"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The new constitution was one of the main topics of discussion at the three-day-long 277th Plenary Conference of the Episcopate.

A statement on the constitution said, among other things, that:

"The Episcopate wishes to remind that an appeal was sent to parliament that the constitution be based on universal values protecting the basic rights of every human being, every family, and the entire nation. A reference to God in the opening sentences of the constitution guarantees that human dignity is protected. Man is not the highest authority in laying down laws. Lawmaking, if it is to be binding for human conscience, must correspond to natural law. Every constitution and legal code represents a specific system of values."

No Natural Laws

The bishops came forth with more specific provisions to be included in the constitution in the past—protecting life from the moment of conception, guaranteeing that religion is taught in schools, seeing to it that a concordat defining relations between the state and church is passed, ensuring that the state be unbiased (yet neither secular nor ideologically neutral).

Although the bishops do not express their disapproval for the constitution in their statement, they do say so when speaking to the press.

"The draft does not mention the natural laws that must be provided for," said Archbishop Jozef Michalik, head of the team that prepared a provisional report on the development of the constitution. "The vision of liberty it contains is unacceptable: 'Everything that is not forbidden is allowed.' That is absurd," claims Archbishop Michalik.

The bishops claim that a vision of the freedom of man which condones his weaknesses, even at the cost of debauching others, is also objectionable.

Bishop Alojzy Orszulik admitted that the Episcopate shares opinions with Michalik's team on the "nihilistic character of the developed draft."

Will They Summon the Faithful?

The Episcopate wants to keep followers of the church informed on its stand on the constitution. Asked whether the Episcopate would call on the faithful to reject the constitution in a referendum, Archbishop Michalik replied: "The draft is unacceptable in its current form. It is nihilistic and underlying it is an appeal to fight all that is moral."

Bishop Stanislaw Stefanek, on the other hand, denounced the statement that the Episcopate would take action to have the constitution disavowed.

Katowice 'Regional Contract' Ready for Signing

MM1906141295 Katowice TRYBUNA SLASKA in Polish 6 Jun 95 pp 1-2

[Article by Oskar Filipowicz: "The Contract Is Ready: Agreement To Be Signed Today—Government Representative Compliments, Warns Participants"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Katowice—Dozens of legislators from Katowice Voivodship, as well as government

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representatives and delegates of a number of social and economic institutions, took part yesterday [5 June] in a meeting prior to the signing of the so-called regional social contract, which will constitute the first element of the final regional contract.

"This should not be seen as some kind of successful venture. It was and is our duty. We can talk in terms of success only when its effects are felt by the people in the region," Marek Kempski, Solidarity leader for the Slask-Dabrowa Gornicza region, said. Participants in yesterday's meeting spoke about a period of 20 to 30 years during which the effects of the ongoing application of the contract's provisions should become visible.

The document carries an appraisal of the socioeconomic situation in the region and a "sound bite" vision of its development, as well as a presentation of the specific aims and the strategy whereby this vision should be implemented. It is the result of six months of negotiations between representatives of local self-government structures, trade unions, local economic self-management structures, and academic circles. The signatories state unanimously in the document that the main axis of the development strategy should comprise the service industries, modern coal extraction and processing, a restructured engineering industry, and also the manufacturing and services sector supplying the construction industry. The agreement contains criticism of the strategy of restructuring the economy by tackling separate sectors of industry rather than individual regions. A sizable chapter is devoted to strategies for improving living standards and the environment. The vision of development presented in the document is to be realized through the application of such strategies as, among other things, an expanded regional financial system comprising a region-based old age and disability pensions scheme, and the creation of new tiers—armed with the corresponding range of powers—in local administration systems.

Jerzy Hausner, adviser to the finance minister and head of the government team of experts responsible for the development of the regional contract, criticized the document for containing a dozen or so "major opacities." According to Hausner, the second section of the regional contract, that is, the agreement between the central and regional governments, cannot be a mere list of demands made of central state authorities, nor can it oblige the latter to implement all the stipulations contained in the agreement.

"You are blazing a completely new trail," the government expert remarked as he congratulated the signatories on the completion of the first part of the contract. "However, the provisions of the second part cannot in any way contravene the laws in force."

"If the government fails to recognize the agreement for what it is—that is, a document setting out proposals for bilateral implementation—and only acknowledges its existence, then we will have a deadlock situation," Jan Rzymelka, chairman of the Local Self-Government Assembly, said.

It was decided that members of parliament who represent our region in the Sejm but who had not previously taken part in the work on the contract—which is by definition a nonpolitical document—should now be entrusted with the responsibility of identifying within it a set of issues which they could subsequently present in the parliamentary forum as questions on which they hold group consensus.

Possible Church Support for Walesa Viewed

WS2006133195 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 20 Jun 95 pp 1-2

[Article by Ewa K. Czaczkowska and Marcin Dominik Zdort: "Will Church Endorse Lech Walesa?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Lech Walesa is bound to be backed by the church, his supporters say. The president has no chance to be endorsed by the Episcopate, Walesa's opponents claim. Only one thing seems to be very likely: The church will endorse a candidate who is able to successfully compete against Aleksander Kwasniewski.

A Man of Conscience Is Needed

One of the questions that politicians have been asking themselves most frequently s the possibility of the church hierarchy supporting one of the rightist candidates. Will the church decide to say as early as the first round of elections which pretender is the closest to it? Or will it wait for the runoff and, just as in the 1990 elections, indicate which of the two "final players" should be backed by Catholics?

During the most recent 272d Conference of the Episcopate, bishops said only that the president should be a man of conscience, a person responsible for the future of Poland. Only Bishop Stanislaw Stefanek said openly that Lech Walesa is such a person. At the very same conference the bishops stated that the draft constitution as it looks now—the constitution which is being prepared by the Constitutional Commission of the National Assembly, chaired by Aleksander Kwasniewski—cannot be approved by the church because it is nihilistic. In this way bishops sent a pretty clear signal: A "no" for

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Kwasniewski's presidency. However, does this mean a "yes" for Walesa?

A Candidate Who Is Able To Defeat Kwasniewski

"The possibility cannot be ruled out that in these elections the church will decide to endorse a candidate earlier than it did in the previous elections, because it has real reason to believe that Kwasniewski will win," believes [Center Accord Chairman] Jaroslaw Kaczynski. Right-wing politicians argue that the church must support one of the rightist candidates because if it does not do this, it will be faced with the following choice in the runoff round: Kwasniewski on the one hand, and either Zielinski or Kuron on the other.

"The church will endorse the candidate who has the best chance of defeating Aleksander Kwasniewski; the church believes that his program threatens to turn Poland into an atheist country and that it is libertine in the moral sense," believes Arkadiusz Urban of the Christian-National Union.

Thus, if the church decides to endorse someone, it will be important whether each bishop will want to point to his own candidate or if the Episcopate's Conference will endorse a common pretender. The latter possibility is more likely in the situation where the left's victory is a very real threat.

A lot seems to indicate, then, that the church will decide to endorse one of the candidates of the rightist-Christian philosophy. Can this candidate be Lech Walesa?

For and Against Walesa

"Until recently Walesa could not count on any form of support from the church. Today, however, when the threat of Kwasniewski's victory is real, when Professor Strzembosz is no longer one of the top candidates, and when Lech Walesa is one of the three leading candidates, such support cannot be ruled out," says Jaroslaw Kaczynski.

There is one reason why Lech Walesa may make a good candidate for the church: He has been checked. He was the one who made statements in favor of ratification of the Vatican concordat; he submitted a motion to the Constitutional Tribunal requesting confirmation of the inconsistency of the mode of work on the ratification of the concordat; he effectively vetoed amendments to the antiabortion law (he declared that he would resign his office rather than sign the amendments); finally, he supported a constitution that would include proposals from the church. "In honor of what the church has done for our homeland, we should bow and correct the draft," he said in Szczecin after a mass ending a session of the Episcopate. Also, he is the one who exhorts people to build an anticommunist camp which would stop the attack of the old forces. Walesa might guarantee that the church would maintain its position.

Church May Lose If It Endorses Walesa

Politicians who are against Walesa's candidacy claim that in recent months the church and Solidarity ["S"] have been actively trying to persuade the president to withdraw from the competition. "Church hierarchy consists of people who think realistically and who certainly realize that Walesa does not have a chance of success anyway; therefore, supporting him would be a nonsensical step, and the church can only lose if it decides to take such a step," says one politician of the St. Catherine Covenant. He also recalls the conflict between the president and the hierarchy members, who unsuccessfully tried to persuade Walesa to abandon the services of his chaplain, Father Alfred Cybula.

Jaroslaw Kaczynski predicts that the church hierarchy will try to find another candidate. Can it be [National Bank President] Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, an activist of the Movement for the Revival of the Holy Spirit [Ruch Odnowy w Duchu Swietym]? "It would be a very bad idea to choose a person from charismatic movements, a person with very strong religious feelings," Kaczynski believes. Supporters of other candidates—such as the president of the National Bank of Poland or former Prime Minister Jan Olszewski—argue that the Episcopate should endorse them rather than anyone else.

The center right and "S" are hoping that the church will take on the task of mediation among the numerous candidates of anticommunist groupings. Bishops, however, will most probably not give their support to any candidate until the situation on the right side of the political scene is clearer. The voice of the church will be heard when it is known who has failed to collect the required 100,000 signatures of support and who fares best in the presidential rankings.

Daily Claims Walesa Likely To Be Reelected

WS2006104695 Warsaw GAZETA SWIATECZNA in Polish 10-11 Jun 95 pp 8-9

[Article by Andrzej Szczypiorski: "Everyone for Walesa"]

[FBIS Translated Text] I have been observing the events unraveling on the political scene prior to the elections from afar. There are two reasons why I have kept my distance. The first is that I have been spending more time abroad than at home. The second is that I feel tired of our politics, which seem to me ineffectual, shallow, devoid of any deeper ideas.

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My observations may thus be skewed, but they may equally well be sensible, considering that when you look at things from a distance you miss some of the details, but your vista is much wider.

From my perspective, everything seems to indicate that Lech Walesa will be the next president of the Polish Republic. All his opponents are doing everything they can to make that happen.

I would not like to be repetitive in voicing my opinions on the current presidency (see, for example, GAZETA WYBORCZA 209/1993). The incumbent president did not fall out of the sky, but was elected by the nation in democratic elections. The next one will be chosen by the very same method, and if it turns out to be Lech Walesa once again, every Pole should respect the will of the majority.

In public life one should not despair. One should simply think.

These days it is thoughtlessness that triumphs, most notably among the Polish political elites. Even reasonable people started believing in miracles.

The Polish leftists generally place absolute faith in the talents and popularity of Aleksander Kwasniewski, who has been leading in all the popularity polls for quite some time now. One Swiss banker told me several days ago: "I do not get it. Why do the Poles think Mr. K. will win the elections if the opinion polls constantly show support for him to be 20-25 percent?"

That banker knows how to count up to a hundred, perhaps because he is a banker. Without using a computer, he calculated that if 25 percent of Poles support Kwasniewski, 75 percent do not.

I am not going to try and tell you that I was enlightened by the Swiss man's remark because I can also count to a hundred and have known for a long time that Kwasniewski has no chance of winning.

Kwasniewski, for some obscure reason, is paving the way to the presidential office for absolutely anyone who makes it to the second round of elections with him. I assume the Democratic Left Alliance's candidate will make it to that second round, although that is not as certain as comments carried by our press and statements issued by our politicians might suggest.

The situation would thus become quite clear for all voters. They would have to decide whether they want all executive and legislative powers to rest in the hands of the postcommunist left. That particular group now has a huge majority in parliament, its representatives make up the Polish Government. Electing Kwasniewski for president would mean that the whole state would be ruled by the so-called postcommunists. The choice of any other candidate would, in the eyes of the Polish constituency, offer a chance of striking some sort of balance.

Kwasniewski is a very talented man, but even in the best case scenario for the election campaign he can hardly count on getting more than 30 percent of votes. This means that his rival could net 70 percent. Everything seems to indicate that a staggering majority of Poles will have to choose the lesser evil. In this situation, anyone who stands against Kwasniewski can count on success.

This is how Aleksander Kwasniewski is contributing to Lech Walesa's reelection. Yet he is not the only one. Others are doing the same.

There are several contenders for the presidency on the right, and their number grows with each passing day. Some analysts say that the rightist candidates will take votes away from Walesa in the first round of elections. They are thus attempting to block the current president's road to reelection.

Those analysts, however, give the impression they do not know the president. I am deeply convinced that Walesa will not attack Kwasniewski in the first round at all, because he can crush the leftist candidate without any effort in the second round. In the initial stage of his election campaign, Walesa will ruthlessly fight all the remaining candidates. It will be an unequal battle for them because they lack Walesa's political cunning, his experience in eliminating political opponents, and his ease that stems from the lack of any inhibitions.

I can already see Professor Strzembosz—a cultural, reflective man—in a clash with Lech Walesa. I am deeply sorry for Mr. Strzembosz, even though I should not be. After all, one should have some imagination and shrewdness if one wants to play an important state role.

Thus, Professor Strzembosz, an otherwise sagacious man and an excellent president of the Supreme Court, has risked his wise head to one with superior wisdom.

One more candidate has recently appeared on the right—[National Bank of Poland] President Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz. She is a very affable woman, if you can judge someone you know only from the television screen. Yet I do not think Ms. Waltz will run against Lech Walesa.

Suggestions made lately by [chairman of the Christian-National Union] Mr. Czarnecki that the incumbent president take time off for several years is an amusing display of naivete.

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Candidate Janusz Korwin-Mikke, candidate Leszek Moczulski, and candidate Jan Olszewski do not gather much public attention because they are an element of political folklore.

One may thus conclude that the right is doing all it can to support Lech Walesa's reelection.

Abroad, the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] is perceived as part of the right, yet on economic issues it is even more leftist than our extraparliamentary right. The current situation in Poland astonishes anyone who thinks rationally, because rational thinkers are incapable of understanding the strange hybrid of our governing coalition—a conservative peasant party and postcommunist social democrats.

The PSL is putting up its own candidate for the elections, only it still is unknown whether this will be Mr. Pawlak or Mr. Zych. The PSL is counting on the support of Polish farmers, who will vote for one their kind. From a distance, however, it is quite clear that even though they are unanimous, the farmers are too small a group to promote their representative, especially if that man is former Prime Minister Pawlak, a politician who can at best be termed as unfortunate. An eminent German scholar, an expert on Poland, said last year: "You can do anything. Two years ago it was difficult to imagine a worse cabinet head than Olszewski. But you found a way to do something about that. Now you have Pawlak."

Both Pawlak and Zych will take away some votes from the candidates of the right and the center, and, quite possibly, from the candidate on the left. Nothing seems to indicate, however, that they will take as much as one vote away from Lech Walesa. Hence, the PSL is also contributing to the current president's victory.

The situation in the center of our political scene is similar. One may assume Professor Zielinski is running in the elections because he has already launched his campaign, although he has not officially announced yet. This is quite an interesting situation. Until recently, Prof. Zielinski vehemently dismissed any suggestions of running for president as absurd. One may hardly hold this against him because, after all, one is entitled to change his opinions, arguing that the circumstances have changed.

The thing is that they have changed for the worse, not for the better. If Zielinski had agreed to run in due time, he would probably have had a huge chance of attracting a huge centrist constituency. Now that Jacek Kuron has entered the race, Prof. Zielinski is doing harm to both himself and Kuron.

This is difficult to understand when one looks from afar. The electoral battle between Kuron and Zielinski cannot be fought with platforms, because they are very similar. This will thus have to be a personal battle, but it will not be a picturesque one because both men are conciliatory types; they usually seek common elements and try to avoid whatever divides. In the eyes of a constituency accustomed to fierce political wrangling, neither one will seem exciting enough.

Thus, the center of our political scene also supports Lech Walesa's reelection.

Looking from afar, our political scene is very baffling, but in fact all these configurations point to a complete lack of experience and a naivete verging on political stupidity. Foreign observers often ask me: "What is all this about?"

I explain as best I can that the majority are most probably after two things: First of all, they want to prevent the postcommunist left from taking full power in the state, and second—to keep Walesa from becoming president for a second term.

It may be assumed that even Kuron and Olszewski, or even Zielinski and Strzembosz agree on that.

If so, why do they not join forces, ask clearheaded people abroad? Is it not obvious that putting up a joint front gives a much bigger chance of success?

Of course, for clearheaded people it is.

Yet Polish politics are not rational at all. What counts most in Polish politics are personal ambitions, wishful thinking, and illusory power.

It takes a lot of ignorance to claim that a candidate on the right stands a chance of winning the presidential elections at present or to believe that a candidate of the postcommunist left could succeed.

Considering the Poles' aerodynamic approach [as published] to life, their scorn for the parlor-forming right and their aversion to the left that might lead to a restitution of the People's Republic, it seems most likely that only a centrist candidate stands a chance of winning against Lech Walesa, especially as the majority of voters no longer want to see him at Belweder.

That majority, it seems, is once again being outmaneuvered, it is being incapacitated by the political class.

In this sense, Walesa's reelection—against the will of the majority—will become, as has been the case in Poland so many times before, a choice of the lesser evil.

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And yet one can vote properly and sensibly. One can forget personal ambitions, give up immature, foolish dreams, and shatter illusion for the sake of the public interest. Combined votes from the Polish left, the Polish right, and the Polish center could go to one centrist candidate who would not only defeat Walesa, but would also prove a good choice for the next five years to come.

Looking from a distance, I do not think this is likely. From afar, I can see a blood-drenched battlefield with many men defeated forever, many caked with mud, devastated and defeated in a way that offends their dignity.

I can also see Lech Walesa in Belweder saying: "I always win!"

The thing is that Walesa has been winning for some time now not because he himself is so strong, but because his opponents are weak.

He proved that when he overturned Pawlak's government. All the president had to back him in the conflict were his very own words, his office, and his will to succeed—nothing more. And the government capitulated. As did the parliament. And the world was stupefied. People said: "Your president banged his fist on the table and five minutes later it was all over!"

This is the man the right—living in a fictitious world—and the left—living a world of illusions—want to stand up against on their own. I think Walesa has already won the elections, unless our political elites change their attitude. One can hardly count on that, however.

CBOS Poll: 50 Percent Oppose Walesa

WS1906100295 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 16 Jun 95 p 3

[Article by Agnieszka Kublik: "CBOS Poll; As Long as It Is Not Walesa?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Journalists claim that the main slogan in the runoff round of the presidential elections will be as follows: "As long as it is not a postcommunist." But the most recent analyses by the Public Opinion Research Center [CBOS] indicate that the slogan may be different: "As long as it is not Walesa."

As many as 50 percent of the respondents say that they will definitely not vote for Lech Walesa in the presidential elections. Aleksander Kwasniewski and Waldemar Pawlak have a little more than half as many "negative" votes (29 and 28 percent, respectively).

Who Can Count on Whom?

Kwasniewski can count on nearly all of the voters of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]. Those who want to vote for him have two things in common: their membership in the Polish United Workers Party, and weak religious affiliation.

The situation in the center and on the right wing looks different: Here voters do not have constant political sympathies. Kuron will be backed only by one in five supporters of the Freedom Union. Just as many would support Zielinski (21 percent). The situation in the Union of Labor [UP] is similar. Its official candidate, Zielinski, can count on only one in five UP members, as can Kuron and Kwasniewski. The most popular right-wing candidate is Adam Strzembosz, with 23 percent; Walesa is supported by only 15 percent. However, in Solidarity, as many as 26 percent of people want to vote for the incumbent president.

Among the voters of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], Waldemar Pawlak enjoys greater support (20 percent) than [Sejm Speaker] Jozef Zych (16 percent). However, the Sejm speaker can count on supporters of other parties and Pawlak cannot. Kwasniewski seems a good presidential candidate to one in five of PSL voters.

Movement of Votes

CBOS asked the respondents what would happen if one of the candidates backed out of the elections.

If Zielinski gave up running, Kwasniewski would gain the most—he would receive more than one-fourth of this vote. Also, Zielinski could count on 25 percent of the votes of the SLD leader's supporters. It turns out, however, that Kuron and Zielinski are not at all trying to attract the same electorate. If Kuron backed out, only 21 percent of his voters would support Zielinski. If Zielinski gave up running, only 10 percent of his supporters would back Kuron. Kuron would benefit more if Walesa were to withdraw from the elections—then he could count on support from one in four of his voters.

The poll was conducted between 26 and 29 May on a representative 1,198-person sample of adult inhabitants of Poland.

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For Whom We Do Not Want To Vote

	Percent
Lech Walesa	50
Leszek Moczulski	43
Janusz Korwin-Mikke	32
Aleksander Kwasniewski	29
Waldemar Pawlak	28
Jacek Kuron	23
Jan Olszewski	17
Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz	11
Zbigniew Religa	10
Adam Strzembosz	7
Jozef Zych	5
Tadeusz Zielinski	3

PPS Supports Zielinski for President

WS1906111895 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 19 Jun 95 p 3

[Article by Dominika Wielowieyska: "PPS Supports Zielinski, While He Is Making Up His Mind; The Socialists Do Not Want Kwasniewski"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Polish Socialist Party [PPS] supports civil rights spokesman Tadeusz Zielinski as its presidential candidate, and they reelected Piotr Ikonowicz for their chairman for a consecutive term.

The 27th PPS Congress was held in Warsaw on 17-18 June.

Before the parliamentary elections of September 1993, the PPS entered the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] coalition and thus obtained three deputies. The SLD excluded PPS from its parliamentary club when the latter refused to vote for the SLD-Polish Peasant Party [PSL] government budget. Currently, the PPS has its own small parliamentary club.

Piotr Ikonowicz said at the congress that the SLD failed to keep its electoral promises and is becoming increasingly rightist. He accused the SLD chairman of failing to include a provision on the ideological neutrality of the state in the draft of the new constitution.

The PPS will not, however, play any part in having Oleksy's cabinet recalled. "If this government was recalled, greater liberals than those within SLD would take over," said Ikonowicz.

The PPS chairman also attacked the heads of public television. The congress appealed to Finance Minister Grzegorz Kolodko to recall the current management board which represents only the right.

The PPS decided to support Tadeusz Zielinski in the upcoming elections. Very few voted in support of Aleksander Kwasniewski. Perhaps this explains why the SLD chairman, despite earlier announcements, did not come to visit the Socialists.

The civil rights spokesman, on the other hand, sent a letter to the delegates excusing himself for his absence at the congress. The reason was that Professor Zielinski does not want to be identified exclusively with the left side of the political scene. He wants to be an "independent and supraparty" candidate.

A staggering majority, however, supported Zielinski. Ikonowicz has already become involved in his campaign. He and Freedom Union Deputy Wojciech Lamentowicz are deputy heads of Zielinski's electoral committee. The head of the committee is independent Deputy Andrzej Micewski (once affiliated with the PSL).

Once the resolution on support for the civil rights spokesman was passed, PPS leaders went to hand it to Prof. Zielinski.

After a meeting with Ikonowicz, the spokesman told "Wiadomosci" [main TV newscast] that he will most

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probably run in the elections. Prof. Zielinski declared several weeks ago that he would withdraw if Jacek Kuron did better in the public opinion polls. Currently he "does not see such a possibility," and quotes sociological research, which points out that he and Kuron have different constituencies.

PSL Divided Over Presidential Candidate

95EP0133A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 10 Jun 95 No 23, p 11

[Article by Janina Paradowska: "The Drought Before the Harvest"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The man the PSL [Polish Peasant Party] members want most to campaign for the presidency of Poland, meaning [Sejm Speaker] Jozef Zych, does not want to be a candidate. The man most PSL members do not want, meaning [former Prime Minister] Waldemar Pawlak, is obstinately pushing forward his candidacy. It certainly looks like the party's support will be gained by the unwanted candidate, since there are no other contenders. Also, because several months ago, when Pawlak was still the prime minister, the PSL Congress had practically idolized him. It is difficult to disavow one's own decisions from one month to another.

The PSL convention was to elect a candidate for the presidency on 29 May. But the mountain turned into a molehill in the form of the declaration that the overall situation in this country is not favorable to naming a candidate and commencing the electoral campaign. Thus, a feeble smokescreen was laid and the nomination postponed to an indefinite future. Properly speaking, everyone was satisfied with this solution, which is clever in view of both the dissension within the party and the external considerations. Pawlak was given time to woo the party grassroots, which have clearly rebelled against him. Were the nomination to take place on 29 May as scheduled, he would have suffered a resounding defeat in the voting. Zych, on his part, thus hopes to wait out the ire of the PSL, which wanted to place in his hands the presidential mace in lieu of the [Sejm] Speaker's baton. The Speaker definitely prefers his baton to the dubious mace. The rebellious grassroots and Pawlak's opponents among the party's leadership keep hoping to convince Zych to change his mind. Pawlak's supporters are pleased that his strongest rival is beginning to lag behind—how long can one keep repeating, I know but I won't say it, and, I have made the decision but I shall not make it public. Should such a tiringly evasive politician, who avoids taking a position on the issue, become a president? Indeed, the situation is beginning to become somewhat ludicrous.

External circumstances also matter. Much indicates that the elections will take place somewhat later than 22 October, meaning that so long as the PSL has not yet named its candidate for the presidency, there will be no PSL point man for other presidential contenders, especially Lech Walesa, to attack. This is a welcome respite for the PSL, which thus hopes to catch up while the candidates other parties will be making mistakes.

Admittedly, there exist many arguments in favor of postponing the nomination of the PSL's candidate, but they are overshadowed by the fundamental issue, namely, the fact that the Polish Peasant Party, the largest and best organized political party in Poland, has found itself in an unenviable situation. Thus, it still lacks a good presidential candidate of its own, it is riven by internal dissension, and, following the fall of Pawlak's government, it has failed to propose some reasonably coherent strategic objective. Even its deputies in Sejm have ceased to champion the interests of the peasantry, as if they were totally ignorant of any goals designated by the party's leadership. This is a totally new situation in the parliament.

In Disarray

As for the PSL's leaders, they are busy with their own things. Following his departure from the post of prime minister, Waldemar Pawlak has been preoccupied with preparations to return to the political scene as a presidential candidate. Jozef Zych is focusing on his job as Speaker of Sejm, which has long been his paramount goal and, it seems, satisfies fully his political ambitions, which rather seem not to include the presidency of Poland, because that would require a decisive approach to conflict situations, which is hardly to the Speaker's liking. It is not without reason that even Zych's supporters are worried that he might not "psychologically" withstand a presidential campaign. The Speaker and his supporters are aware that playing the role of the Man of Providence requires certain character traits, including a modicum of leadership charisma, which Zych normally lacks. As for [the possible candidacy of Minister of Agriculture] Roman Jagielinski, he was made a cabinet minister without any political support in the hope that he would stumble and would soon have to render an account for failing to meet the demands of the peasants. Jagielinski is regaining lost positions, but there is little time left. Once he has gained the reputation of being a supporter of big landowners and an oppressor of smallholders, it will still take some time to wear off. Senate Speaker Adam Struzik has, despite his strenuous efforts, failed to become a major public figure. As for Deputy Prime Minister Aleksander Luczak, the public does not seem to have heard of him

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either. Bogdan Pek, on the other hand, still holds on to the considerable publicity he has gained by rushing to speak up whenever he can shine as a defender of public wealth being surrendered to the fangs of feral capital. Bogdan Pek's belief in his presidential chances is a symbolic reflection of the current state of the PSL.

The personnel policy of the PSL chairman [Pawlak], which consists in getting rid of all competitors for power and surrounding himself with a close entourage of loyal followers, has borne fruit. The PSL continues to be in disarray and its members, having become disoriented, either shift their personal preferences in favor of whoever is closer to power or feel frustrated. Not even a trace has remained of the euphoria from the times of the "our peasant prime minister." It appears that, in a few weeks, Convention participants will choose the lesser evil, that is, they will nominate a presidential candidate who is already branded by a double defeat [Pawlak, who was twice prime minister], who has not proved equal to his office as prime minister, and who lacks any ideas for revitalizing the party, other than one, namely, that the PSL must be the party in power—power for his own people and hangers-on.

Unless Jozef Zych drops his "I know, but I won't say it," which at present means that he will not resign as Speaker of Sejm, the road to the nomination, and thereby also to affirming that he continues to be the leader around whom the PSL must willy-nilly rally, is open to Waldemar Pawlak. It was the "accomplishment" of the first part of the Convention that it revealed the absence of any competing presidential contenders from within the PSL. Perhaps Roman Jagielinski could have been such a contender had he begun to be sponsored a year or two ago. Undoubtedly he looks better under the portrait of Witos [Wincenty Witos, the revered prewar Polish peasant leader] than the PSL's chairman himself, and he is rapidly maturing as a politician, and the news from the government so far is that he indeed understands the need to modernize the countryside and wants to leave behind him a solid legacy as minister of agriculture. However, the party's top leadership has been focusing on relegating, to put it diplomatically, competitors to the shadows rather than on creating a fairly balanced leadership collective within which one member can replace another in the event of failure.

Natural Authority

Speaker Zych's authority has been growing rather unexpectedly and somewhat naturally. It was enhanced by his deft leadership in the Sejm, adroit navigation through the tangled thicket of the interests of various factions, and constant reference to the opinions of the statutory leaders of the PSL, which undoubtedly encouraged those who were alienated by the concentration of power within a narrow elite centered around the PSL chairman. The Speaker's authority has also been enhanced by the awareness that in the public perception he is practically the last remaining national figure who can embody the bond between town and country and somewhat improve the image of the PSL as a party that is not exclusively a peasant-class party. Hence the rather unexpected flood of support coming especially from the grassroots, from the provinces where, as can be seen, [the peasants] have not yet completely lost their sense of reality and the fairly healthy belief that a person who proved a disappointment while prime minister has hardly any chance of glittering as the president of Poland.

Waldemar Pawlak appears blind to these factors. He has recently expressed his healthy self-esteem while taking part in a Sejm debate on foreign policy, in a manner which was widely interpreted as launching his presidential campaign. He castigated foreign policy, declared that the [foreign] minister does not represent the Polish raison d'etat, and voiced various phobias and apprehensions concerning [Poland's future integration] with a Europe that is uniting itself. He also hinted, for yet another time, that in reality he is in the opposition and not part of the governing coalition [although actually the PSL is a member of the governing coalition], thus perplexing his fellow party stalwarts, some of whom had to abandon making their prepared speeches so as not to say something that would conflict with the utterances of the PSL chairman.

Pawlak's speech deserves special attention. This is not an isolated incident that can be glossed over. This is the credo of Pawlak the presidential candidate. It will include such additional elements as a sharply antiliberal tack and opposition to privatization and decentralization. He will also begin to accuse the government of not being sufficiently propeasant and protectionist, and ultimately of not being sufficiently pro-Polish. It is simply that Waldemar Pawlak is resuming the role which he had played years ago as the leader of an opposition party. Such was the rhetoric he then employed, and he is returning to it now. He had abandoned it for about a year and half while he was prime minister, because a prime minister cannot always get away with what, speaking euphemistically, an opposition deputy can get away with. Thus we had almost forgotten what kind of man Waldemar Pawlak can be when he has to fight his way out. He has to bet everything on his presidential campaign, because that is an all-or-nothing game, a game for his own political future and for his leadership of the PSL. Should he lose that campaign, that could be the end of his political career. At age 36, when a man

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has already been prime minister twice and had to depart from that office twice, and not of his own volition either, it is difficult to accept such a prospect.

Pawlak's Credo

To the former prime minister the current governing coalition is no shibboleth. His closest associates admit that the coalition is transitory, because the political alignment is bound to change after the presidential elections. Neither has Pawlak any reasons for identifying himself with a government on which his influence is limited, especially considering that he has appointed his major PSL opponents to key positions in that government. The PSL is increasingly flirting with the rightist parties, including the most radical, extraparliamentary party. The coming presidential elections and early parliamentary elections may fit closely the scenarios under review at present. Early parliamentary elections were urged by Pawlak immediately after he had to depart from office as prime minister. At the time, his party, the PSL, was cool to this idea, but it does not mean that it has been completely discarded the idea.

Quite a few PSL members seem to believe that Jozef Zych will have a realistic chance to be elected president of Poland, at least during the runoff elections. As for the chances of Waldemar Pawlak, it is chiefly he, himself, who believes in them, along with his close entourage of associates famous for their computer forecasts which not so long ago had predicted that Pawlak would remain prime minister for many more years in becalmed political waters. Nowadays these forecasts supposedly say that Pawlak would win some 15 or so percent of votes in the first round of presidential elections, which given the lottery that the first round will probably be like, is to bear fruit in the championship meet during the subsequent runoff elections. But first one has to be [nominated] a presidential candidate.

Committee of 100 Prepares Fund-Raising Campaign

WS1906083295 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 16 Jun 95 p 3

[Article by Dominika Wielowieyska and CG: "Eighty Committees of the Committee of 100; Bielecki Counts on Taxpayers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Czeslaw Bielecki has already set up 80 committees. By the end of June he will decide whether his Committee of 100 should be dissolved. However, he is certain of his success already today. Members of the committee met on 14 June in Warsaw. Participating in the meeting were also founders of new committees from all over Poland. There was no discussion, as no one wanted to take the floor.

Organization of the Committee of 100 is being taken care of by architect Czeslaw Bielecki and former Foreign Affairs Minister Andrzej Olechowski. At the founding meeting in April, the committee's leaders announced that unless they built structures within three months, the committee would dissolve itself. "I believe that we will go on working," Bielecki told GAZETA WYBORCZA.

The committee defends "liberal-conservative values." For the time being, its members do not want to deal with the presidential elections. However, at the meeting on 14 June its participants spoke off the record about Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz.

Bielecki himself says that the most important thing for the committee is the taxation campaign. Thanks to the sale of labels with the inscription "invest in the tax system" (at 1 zloty each), the committee wants to raise money to work out a draft of a tax system. Bielecki and Olechowski are counting on 2 million private entrepreneurs and 6 million people employed in privately owned firms.

The committee consists of, among others, members of the Conservative Party, Freedom Union, former members of Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms, as well as members of the Union for Real Politics. As its members say, the committee should become a platform where the center-right can reach an agreement.

Anti-Semitic Sermon, Walesa's Response Decried

WS2006121995 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 20 Jun 95 p 5

[Commentary by Dawid Warszawski: "Is the Canon an Anti-Semite?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is not important whether Father Jankowski is anti-Semitic or not. It is not a public problem, but a problem of conscience—human, Catholic, sacerdotal. His statements, however, are unquestionably anti-Semitic.

Anyone who has any doubts should consider the sentence that was uttered in the sermon on 11 June—"The Star of David is inscribed in the symbols of the swastika and the hammer and sickle."—and replace the words "Star of David" with the words "the White Eagle" or "the Cross." Would we not then have an anti-Polish, or, respectively, anti-Jewish statement?

It is both disgraceful and grotesque that Father Jankowski claims he is not anti-Semitic and offends the Jews in the same breath by putting the blame for communism and World War II on their "satanic greed." Thus, the more laudable the apology extended "to all

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those that felt offended" offered by the Episcopate Commission for Dialogue With Judaism.

It is pitiful, however, that the Episcopate Conference that is currently in session did not take a stance on the issue. Could it be that the Church believes anti-Semitism in churches is an issue for the Jews and those who dialogue with them—and not simply one for Christians?

We should note with respect the unequivocal statements issued by the civil rights spokesman, the Polish PEN Club, Jerzy Ficowski, Jacek Kaczmarski, several readers of GAZETA WYBORCZA, and, of course, Jewish organizations. And that is it. The silence that fell after Father Jankowski's words has become less deafening, but it is still silence.

The Poles, just like one of my colleagues on the editorial board, "have had enough of anti-Semites and Jews." The insulting and the insulted. What a remarkable piece of mind.

The silence was broken by President Walesa, who was present at church when the sermon was delivered. As he said on Radio Zet: "I am a very good friend of Father Henryk, a longstanding friend. I wish to say that the canon is by no means anti-Semitic. Because I am very well aware of this, I am not speaking out on the issue. I am afraid, however, that there are people who want to incite anti-Semitism in Poland, and I do not like that. I am not anti-Semitic myself, and I will not speak out on the issue. I wish to stress that I will not, because I do not want to enter the anti-Semitic discussion."

The president, who made several anti-Semitic statements in the previous election campaign himself, is probably not the best judge in this case.

He did, however, speak on behalf of Poland, on behalf of all of us, and on behalf of all of you. He officially endorsed anti-Semitism, gagging all critics with blackmail. Please keep this in mind whenever someone brings up the issue of "illegitimate claims the Jews make anew on Poland and the Poles." Also, bear this mind when we vote in the upcoming elections. We will then decide whether the president of the Polish Republic can share Lech Walesa's views.

Status of Defense Industry Discussed

95EP0127A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish
20 May 95 No 20, p 7

[Article by Marek Henzler: "Maneuvers in Front of the Arsenal"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Of the once mighty armaments industry—80 plants employing 200,000 people—there remains nowadays a residue in the form of 31 plants employing about 80,000 people, which should be rather pungently termed "disarmaments industry."

This industry is nowadays a "bomb" to our economy and country, one that requires "disarming," as indicated by the newly initiated, rotating strikes at arms plants.

In his March interview in TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC, Stanislaw Glowacki, chairman of the Arms Industry Section of the NSZZ Solidarity National Committee, blamed...Henryk Goryszewski, chief of the president's National Security Bureau and Jerzy Szmajdzinski, SLD [Democratic Left Alliance] deputy and chairman of the Sejm National Defense Committee, for this situation. He accused the former of "lacking energy and imagination" and the latter of "anti-Polish political concepts" and readiness to barter our national sovereignty for dubious benefits on the "Eastern [CIS] market...." The real causes of the collapse of the domestic arms industry are, however, more complicated than those perceived by Chairman Glowacki.

First of all, it should be realized that in 1987 the personnel of the Polish Armed Forces totaled 407,000, whereas today it is about 240,000. Since this represents a 40-percent downsizing, it would be difficult to expect the demand for arms to remain the same. In the meantime the Warsaw Pact has been dissolved and agreements for shipments of military equipment to member countries of that military pact, including the former USSR, our biggest supplier but at the same time also our biggest arms customer (80 percent of Polish arms exports), have in practice been disrupted. Our arms exports to Iraq and Libya also have collapsed (for we began to adhere to the United Nations embargo), and likewise an embargo on shipments to the countries of the former Yugoslavia has been introduced. Until recently, moreover, we have "voluntarily" restricted our exports by adhering to the blacklist prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and not selling weaponry to countries in which civil wars raged (e.g., Burma, Afghanistan, Mozambique, or Sudan) and wherever better relations with a given country's neighbor mattered more to us (e.g., Taiwan).

On the foreign market we encounter sharp competition from former socialist countries, especially the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Ukraine, which are emptying their depots of post-Russian military equipment and exploring ways of keeping their own arms plants busy. The parade has also been joined by the Germans, who are getting rid of the equipment left by the former National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic. As a result, our arms exports dropped by about 85 percent, and we fell from seventh place in the world among arms exporters to a place in the teen.

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When our Armed Forces, too, allocated only one-fourth as much money as previously for arms purchases, the productive capacity of our arms industry was utilized barely 20 percent. This caused our plants to rapidly contract a huge debt (about 15 trillion old zlotys), with most of them approaching the verge of bankruptcy.

In order to somehow survive, a completely new model of arms industry plants had to be adopted. Prior to 1990 civilian production at these plants served chiefly to camouflage military production. (Predom, one of the largest arms manufacturing associations, was officially called the Association for the Manufacture of Household Appliances....) These days, now that the market for military orders is fluid and even the nature and size of purchases by our own military are hardly known, the Ministry of Industry has adopted the premise that only 30 percent of output at arms enterprises should be military, with the remaining 70 percent devoted to civilian production. This is a standard close to the worldwide standard. Experts believe that then, if civilian production is properly marketed, arms plants could somehow manage even if one year they receive no orders from the military or no contracts for arms exports.

But are our bigger arms plants, such as Bumar-Labedy (tanks), Mielec WSK [Transportation Equipment Plant] (aircraft), or Mesko in Skarzysko (rockets, ammunition), capable of converting as much as 70 percent of their output to civilian production? Precision mechanics at the Radom Lucznik Plant, who assemble machine pistols, had no problems in handling the manufacture of typewriters in the 1970's, but nowadays, with the growing spread of computers, it is difficult to imagine them as computer assemblers.

For such companies the Ministry of Industry perceives an opportunity in the form of coproduction ties with other, typically civilian plants. Most arms enterprises, such as Lucznik, Bumar, or the Stalowa Wola Steel Plant, operate with many interesting and atypical technologies, which until now have often been inaccessible to civilian companies. Thus, Bumar currently manufactures, e.g., subassemblies for Volvo trucks and large structural metal components, for German companies, while its tank manufacturing lines now serve to build self-propelled cranes. At present, the continued existence of Bumar, once a typical tank manufacturing plant, depends only 50 percent on military orders.

But not every arms plant can accomplish this. The stamping-press plant in Bolechow near Poznan cannot convert overnight from the manufacture of shell casings to cooking pots or pressing irons, let alone the consideration that a pressing iron manufactured on a "military" production line will cost more than one manufactured by a "civilian" plant. Now that "camouflaging" civilian production at arms plants is no longer being subsidized and this country is being inundated with cheap imported household appliances, it is difficult to identify products that would safeguard jobs for the workforce and at the same time be competitive on the market.

Hence also the arms industry links—and justly at that—its survivability to increased orders for making what it does best, that is, manufacturing weaponry. The currently striking Solidarity trade unionists at the arms plants are demanding government orders for equipment to be supplied to our military. They even are demanding that the Defense Ministry be legally obligated to make purchases from Polish arms plants.

In a way, these demands are warranted. For the last few years our generals have lacked a clear vision of what arms to equip our military with. They placed too much faith in Poland's rapid admission to NATO, which would result in consigning most of our post-Soviet armaments to the scrap heap. Nowadays it is well known that Polish generals will yet have to wait [before they can play] NATO "games." Likewise, nothing has so far come of the rather "exotic" agreement for military technical cooperation with Turkey, and we must arm our military with equipment from Polish plants.

Deputy Minister of Industry Roman Czerwinski, who is in charge of the arms industry, even believes that trips abroad would be useful to our military. For then they would see that the so-called NATO standards do not mean the same caliber of every gun barrel but are chiefly standards for communications, logistics, and command systems. Such systems are indeed common to the entire NATO but, on the other hand, nearly every bigger NATO country is making its own tanks. The Polish military, itself, has by now changed its views: In accordance with the declarations of the Ministry of Defense, which are supported by the Ministry of Industry, 70 percent of military equipment can and will be manufactured in Poland—with allowance for the indispensable improvements in electronic and communications systems. As to whether the military will buy it, that will depend on its quality—the military says that it will not be suckered into buying shoddy goods—and on the ministry's budget. Now, if the Sejm resolution adopted following last January's debate on the condition of our army is adhered to, defense spending in 1996 should rise to 2.8 percent of the gross national product, and in 1997 to 3 percent. Unless the Defense Ministry's budget is increased, we shall not only disarm our military but also bring about the bankruptcy of our arms industry, with 80,000 highly skilled workers—in regions where unemployment is already high—being laid off.

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Another opportunity can be afforded by higher exports, and in this respect we already have somewhat rebounded from the nadir last year: Our arms sales were about $100 million. To a large extent, however, these exports consisted of military stocks such as ammunition for T-34 tanks which is no longer in any way suitable for us.

Last March, when trade unionists from Solidarity's Armaments Section organized a demonstration in front of the Office of the Council of Ministers and burned, among other things, an effigy of Prime Minister Oleksy, TRYBUNA stated that the president is interfering with the arms industry. Minister R. Czerwinski believes that such protests are rather due to the indeed difficult situation of part of the workforce. The wages in the defense industry are close to the national average, but at some of its plants they are barely 60 percent of that average. In that respect the WSK Mielec, Pronit-Pionki, and Stomil Grudziadz continue to lag at the tail end, but there also are good plants such as the Warsaw Industrial Optics Center and Radwar. There also are plants such as Mesko where, under the advertising slogan "We will always target you," the domestic manufacture of Stinger-type antiaircraft missiles is commencing but even so they have to lay off another thousand employees. But there also already exist some plants which are again beginning new hirings.

The situation in the defense industry should be normalized by the acceptance of a collective bargaining agreement. More than one-half of the industry's plants have already concluded composition agreement proceedings with their creditors, and the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers has promised more than a trillion old zlotys for armaments previously shipped to the former USSR. In addition, more funds are to be found to compensate for the cost of maintaining so-called the strategic production reserve, that is, currently inactive production lines kept ready to operate in wartime.

The most difficult problem will be to satisfy the demand for the "property empowerment" of the workforces by granting them gratis 20 percent of stock in the enterprises. Current regulations provide for only 15 percent. It is interesting anyhow that the workforce is demanding to be granted shares in heavily indebted and money-losing enterprises. It may be that they believe in a bright future for the industry. It is good that someone believes in it....

Bank's PSL Links, Practices Viewed

95EP0138A Poznan WPROST in Polish 14 May 95 No 20, pp 25-26

[Article by Artur Witoszek and Andrzej Zybala: "Bottomless Coffers: The Food Industry Bank Attends To Redistributing National Income, Transferring Money From the Taxpayer's Wallet to the Till of Selected Companies"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Between March and August 1994 the Food Industry Bank transferred, as part of its capital strategy, $15 million to a Dutch company and two Swiss companies. (Langland Bay Equitis, Ltd., of Zurich received $5 million; Jersey Invest, Ltd., also of Zurich, $8 million; and Global Investments CV, of Castricum, $2 million.) Several months after the transfer of these funds, renowned financial research agencies failed to locate two of these companies. In addition, $6 million was invested in two Vancouver companies: Farrel Financial, Ltd., and AMF Capital Corp. To be sure, their addresses and offices are legitimate, but to this day financial researchers have failed to learn anything about their operations.

At the time these funds were transferred, the chairman of the Food Industry Bank was Kazimierz Olesiak, who became head of the bank's governing board in February 1994. He was appointed to that post thanks to the support of the then Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak [of the Polish Peasant Party—PSL]. Previously the new bank chairman used to be the director of the Warsaw branch of the Rolbank, most of whose loans proved to be difficult to recover.

In the opinion of Dr. Antoni Magdon, chairman of the supervisory council of the Food Industry Bank, the money transfers to the accounts of the foreign companies occurred during the period of the "interregnum," that is, when Chairman Janusz Cichosz stepped down from his post and his successor did not yet assume his duties. According to Andrzej Zawadzki, a member of the bank's governing board—between September 1994 and April 1995 he was a vice chairman of the bank—the failed investments were arranged under the previous governing board and executed under the current one. Zawadzki claims that the governing board was not notified about these transactions. The decision was taken by a member of the bank's brokerage department and accepted by his immediate superior. Andrzej Zawadzki commented, "Each day the bank is investing even greater amounts," and argued that these investments were "a work accident." In the opinion of experts, it is hardly likely for such a sizable sum to leave the bank without the approval of its top officers. The Food Industry Bank maintains a list of trustworthy companies. Why is it then that completely unknown companies suddenly were included among the bank's partners?

According to Andrzej Zawadzki, so far two of the five abovementioned companies have not returned the money borrowed plus interest [as published]. Our in-

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formants claim that this applies to all five. The period of maturity of the loans has already elapsed, and on 19 April 1995 the bank's supervisory council placed the governing board under the obligation of notifying the public prosecutor's office. The Warsaw Voivodship Public Prosecutor's Office has not, however, confirmed receiving a request to initiate proceedings. Andrzej Zawadzki commented that no one at the bank knows who made the mistake. So far no one has been made accountable. "We are awaiting an explanation from the Public Prosecutor's Office," said Dr. Antoni Magdon. The bank's officers admit that it was a technical error to transfer money in the form of investments to non-banking institutions.

It is no secret that the bank's policy is decided by the PSL, which, however, has proved incapable of selecting persons with even elementary knowledge of banking for executive posts in that bank. Criticism is being voiced within the PSL itself. Tadeusz Sytek, a PSL deputy, chairman of Interkotlin Company, and a customer of the Food Industry Bank, said, "This bank is not ready for operation in the new conditions. Where could these people learn the art of banking, and how many of them can at least speak English?" Yet Deputy Sytek believes that in the future the Food Industry Bank will be the largest bank in Central-East Europe. "A foreign investor to lead the bank out of the abyss will surface," he explained.

However, the deputy's optimism appears unwarranted, because the World Bank merely offers assistance in financing the acquisition of equipment and the training of employees. The latest World Bank report on the Food Industry Bank is unusually critical. Chairman Sytek's concern about the bank's condition did not prevent him from asking the Food Industry Bank on 12 August 1994 to grant Sliewescom BV, a Dutch company, loan guarantees for $5,040,000. The bank granted $2.2 million in guarantees, which, owing to the implementation of these guarantees, it subsequently had to exchange for a loan granted to Chairman Sytek.

In the last five years, the Food Industry Bank has granted many loans which engender suspicion of deliberate action to damage that bank. In no case, however, there has been an epilogue in the form of a court trial.

The bank's main office in Warsaw has, according to its report of February 1993, granted loans which in 80 percent of cases were relatively uncollectable. Yet, the same persons still remain loan officers. Krystyna Majerczyk-Zabowka, a current board vice chairperson, has been working at the main office since 1979, having advanced since then from an auditor to the director of the Loan Department.

The 232 billion old zlotys loaned to Krzysztof Duda could not be recovered. Similarly, Feliks Siemienas, who gained fame by buying a library for President Reagan, was "sponsored" by the Ostroda branch of the Food Industry Bank, by being granted loans in the absence of any collateral. NIK [Supreme Chamber of Audit] auditors have uncovered close ties between one individual, or even a family, and the loan applications submitted by many companies; for example, several defaulted loans were granted to applicants having the name Skrobol: J. P. Skrobol and Co. in Koszalin; Hanna and Piotr Skrobol Supermarket in Koszalin; Teresa Skrobol Import-Export Trading Company in Pszczyn; J. Skrobol and Co. in Pszczyn; Piotr Skrobol Mushroom Growing Company in Sianow near Koszalin; Domex, and PW Kamargo.

The NIK also found that many loan guarantees are linked to a single company, such as Batax, Ltd., owned by Wiktor Kubiak (the main sponsor of the musical spectacle "Metro"). It was owing to such loan guarantees and its inept foreign exchange policy that the bank has suffered its greatest losses. In the years 1990-92 alone the Food Industry Bank granted 558 guarantees for loans worth $341 million.

To this day the lawsuit for the recovery of 42 million French francs for which the Food Industry Bank granted in 1994 loan guarantees to the ACP Company, is continuing. In addition, the bank lost 2.5 million German marks by guaranteeing a loan to another company, Corso. Is it true that, as our informants claim, these companies are linked to highly placed former officers of the Food Industry Bank and the PSL? As early as at the beginning of 1993 the Food Industry Bank paid out nearly 1 trillion old zlotys owing to loans defaulted by its customers.

Son-Pol, a company in Piotrkow Trybunalski, did not even have any collateral to provide in return for a loan guarantee. When the company declared bankruptcy, it did not document any liabilities owed to the Food Industry Bank, which had to pay $1 million for its defaulted loans. The bank's foreign capital investments also were money losers. In September 1992 the Food Industry Bank resold previously purchased stock to a London brokerage house, losing $762,000 on this transaction.

Thus, the bank's deplorable financial performance is not surprising. Toward the end of 1993 it reported losses in the amount of nearly 16 trillion old zlotys. In September 1994, after it became transformed into a joint-stock company, its losses reached more than 24 trillion old zlotys, and its margin of solvency was minus 75.3 percent. (The National Bank of Poland, the central

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bank, requires a margin of solvency of plus 8 percent.) According to a Ministry of Finance report, during the subsequent three months the bank lost an additional half a trillion old zlotys. By the end of 1994, however, owing to a subsidy of 12 trillion old zlotys financed by the Polish taxpayer (a year previously the state budget paid the bank a subsidy of more than 4 trillion), the reported loss was reduced to 8.6 trillion old zlotys. The Food Industry Bank claims in its defense that all the commercial banks have received restructuring bonds. But no other bank (not even the PKO BP) has received such a huge subsidy.

It is difficult to estimate the extent to which the debt linked to the financing of central investments encumbers the bank's financial performance. Chairman Kazimierz Olesiak commented in an interview that his aim is to have his bank relieved of the debt of about 9 trillion zlotys owed by the Farm Ownership Agency of the State Treasury, plus 3.5 trillion zlotys in loans granted for the needs of central investments. If these amounts are really the case, then the problem would be solved thanks to the already transmitted government bonds valued at 16 trillion old zlotys. This demonstrates that there also exist other reasons for the troubling situation of the Food Industry Bank. In the opinion of a certain PSL politician, at least one-fifth of the bad loans is due to mismanagement and cronyism in granting loans without adequate collateral.

By the end of 1994 the bank granted loans totaling more than 43 trillion old zlotys, and in this respect it ranked second among the Polish banks. According to the latest report of the Ministry of Finance, relatively uncollectable loans account for 57 percent of all the loans granted, and of these nearly one-half might as well be viewed as definitely defaulted. But the Food Industry Bank itself has provided an even more pessimistic estimate, stating that 67 percent of all the loans granted are so-called unpromising loans, of which more than 70 percent can be considered defaulted.

To general surprise, the aggregate debt of private farmers is only 128 billion old zlotys. All the other loans have been granted to enterprises, cooperatives, and joint-stock companies.

The Ministry of Finance defends the peasant-bank colossus, claiming that the capital subsidies were granted not so much to the Food Industry Bank as to the debt-laden enterprises of the agricultural and food sector. [It thus argues that] the Food Industry Bank rescued Hortex [a fruit and vegetable exporter] from bankruptcy by exchanging its debt for shares. The philosophy of the state as co-owner of the Food Industry Bank and generous donor thereto is simple: The bank has become the principal instrument of state intervention. It is the bank, in addition to the state budget, that attends to redistributing national income, that is, to transferring money from the taxpayer's wallet to the till of selected companies. It is through this bank that the ministers of finance and agriculture can decide which companies are to survive and which—of a certainty the private ones—to sink under. A favorite firm from a favorite [state] sector can always count on being forgiven a loan contracted from the Food Industry Bank, as a bank officer has commented, the rationale being the poor condition of that sector.

Without a doubt, the PSL continues to keep this bank under its protection, a potentate in agriculture and the food industry. Depositors in this bank include dairies, processing plants, farms, etc. Not infrequently, these firms have direct ties to PSL activists. The bank has been granting loans without regard to eventual bankruptcy of borrowers so long as they belonged to the agricultural and food sector.

Among the reasons for the difficult situation of the Food Industry Bank, experts from the World Bank mention the absence of clear loan-processing procedures and the high cost of the money market. Only the PKO BP, which, however, is a retail bank, has higher operating expenses than the Food Industry Bank. Too large a part of loans, 77 percent, is granted to agriculture and food processing. Any rationally operating bank diversifies its loan portfolio so that when one subsector is in financial straits other subsectors can still provide income to the bank. Likewise, the bank's administrative expenses are too high. There are too few accounts per bank employee. According to the World Bank, if the status quo continues, by the end of this century the Food Industry Bank may operate in the red to the extent of 40 trillion old zlotys. In comparison, closing this bank in on 31 March 1995 would cost 27 trillion.

The PSL has failed to bring about a recovery of the Food Industry Bank and the cooperative banks. The extremely well-meaning Law on Restructuring the Food Industry and Cooperative Banks proved to be a scrap of paper. The Finance Ministry's report on the implementation of that law confirms that it is a bad law, according to Maria Zajaczkowska, a Freedom Union deputy. The restructuring of the bank proposed by the World Bank is close to that law in its basic premises. But there arises the question of whether these premises are realistic in view of the bank's situation and the interests of the PSL.

The aforesaid law provided for the formation of nine regional banks by the end of 1994. Unfortunately, the only bank acting as a regional one is the Gospodarczy Bank Wielkopolski SA in Poznan, whose shareholders

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realized that by implementing the law on restructuring they would rapidly receive financial support in order to rescue cooperative banks. The remaining cooperative banks have not gathered sufficient capital, with most founding groups collecting at most 5 to 40 billion old zlotys (as against the 150 billion zloty minimum required by the National Bank of Poland to charter a bank of this kind). Some of these groups did not even know how to correctly fill out applications for banking licenses.

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Iliescu Denies Reports of KGB Association

AU2006112695 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 13 Jun 95 p 3

[Excerpt from an interview given by Romanian President Ion Iliescu to an unidentified correspondent from Romanian national television in Bucharest on 13 June]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Last night, during a special edition of the "Current Events" news program, President Ion Iliescu replied to the accusations made by the daily newspaper ZIUA in connection with his alleged KGB association during the years he spent as a student in Moscow.*

After a long delay since the scandal broke out in the press, the president denied any kind of collaboration with the KGB and the truthfulness of the things published by ZIUA.

According to the president, the Romanian Embassy [in Moscow] has officially requested that the Russian state authorities, as well as the management of the institute where he is supposed to have been recruited by the KGB, should investigate this, as well as the existence of Igor Botnarychuk, his presupposed KGB recruiter. The official reply was that everything was pure invention.

Ion Iliescu also used this occasion to rebuke, in characteristic style, all those who had asserted that he had studied at the Frunze Academy—the military academy of the USSR—or that he was a good friend of the last USSR president, Mikhail Gorbachev. Furthermore, in his statement the president pointed out that he had spent his first year at university at the Polytechnic Institute in Bucharest and, therefore, could not possibly have been recruited by the KGB during his very first year at university, as the accusations claimed.

Following a scrutiny of the [Moscow] institute's archives, it was found that no person called Igor Botnarychuk was there during that time, either among the students or among the administration or teaching staff of the institute.

As to the uniforms published in the press [photographs showing Iliescu wearing a uniform], Ion Iliescu explained that they were in no way KGB uniforms, but rather simple uniforms of the Mining Institute. Finally President Iliescu referred to the photograph showing him together with his wife and revealed that his wife, Nina, is a "true-born Romanian," answering accusations that she was Hungarian, Russian, or Jewish.

[Iliescu] People who do not have any access at all to public opinion and lack all credibility whatsoever seek other ways to make themselves heard. This is what this undignified tabloid, ZIUA, is doing, too, in launching the entire campaign. (...) What they really wanted is for me to engage in a dialogue with them, to answer their accusations, and so on.

As I have already vehemently pointed out: I have never had contacts of any kind and, therefore, could not possibly have been recruited either by Romanian or foreign special services.

As a matter of fact, I have officially requested, the Romanian Embassy has officially requested, the [Russian] state authorities, as well as the management of the institute, to investigate if there did exist, at least, such a thing. They received an official reply, which is to be published tomorrow, that it was a shameless lie, a mere invention of this individual, who lacks all moral authority whatsoever, as is the typical mental stance of all mercenaries, a paid informer, who in his whole life has done nothing but serve those who offered to pay him, regardless of scruples, I mean without any scruples, and who invents all sorts of lies. (...)

I was a student, they claim, at the Frunze Academy, that is, a military academy, something that anyone acting in good faith would have discovered from one single glance as a lie, and they claim that I studied at the [Moscow] university and thus got to know Gorbachev during my student years. Well, he graduated from the university, while I myself went to the Energy Institute. I did not go to Moscow for my very first study year, but rather only at the beginning of my second one. One of these accusations claims: "He was recruited in his very first year..." Well, I spent my very first year here, at the Bucharest Polytechnic Institute.

(...) They checked the archives of the institute: There was no one bearing that name (here Iliescu refers to his alleged KGB recruiter) among the teaching staff, the administrative personnel, or the students, at the time I was a student there. Nor did the second name mentioned by daily COTIDIANUL actually exist.

First they made my wife a Hungarian, then a Russian, and most recently a Jewish woman. And what if she really were? Would it be a crime if she were Jewish? But she happens to be a true-born Romanian.

They published a photograph with three youths wearing uniforms, meaning: "Here you can see the KGB uniforms." But those were the uniforms of the Mining Institute or the Oil Institute, I cannot recall precisely, in Moscow. Our Mining Institute had its own uniforms, so those were not KGB uniforms, but rather those of the students' institutions.

As far as I am concerned, I may have been the object, as a matter of fact I am sure I have been, of investigation

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agencies' attention and that of the KGB, as well as of the Romanian Securitate, the last of these being certain.

UDMR Protests Hostile Campaign, Letter Bombs

AU2006104795 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 10 Jun 95 p 3

["Communique" from the UDMR Presidential Office; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] We draw the attention of domestic and international public opinion to certain extremely grave events that have recently taken place in Romania. In the 31 May to 6 June period, the leaders of certain organizations belonging to ethnic minorities living in this country have been the targets of death threats. In succession, Bela Marko, president of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR], Dr. Paul Philippi, the president of the Democratic Forum of Germans in Romania, Nicolae Gheorghe, the secretary of the Romanies' Ethnic Federation, and Reform Bishop Laszlo Tokes, the UDMR's honorary chairman, have received letters bombs.

These events have taken place in an atmosphere hostile to the ethnic minorities, one created and being artificially maintained by, unfortunately, the highest echelons. The campaign of vilification against the legitimate representatives of ethnic Hungarians has reached alarming heights in the Romanian Parliament. Senators and deputies belonging to the governing arch have not hesitated to demand that our union be outlawed, that certain UDMR representatives be deported from the country, and even that the death sentence be reintroduced. The UDMR, an organization that was founded legally and operates within the laws of this state, was described in the Romanian Senate as "a terrorist and paramilitary" organization.

This is regrettable and it may have tragic consequences that none of the representatives of the democratic political parties, none of the representatives of civic society, and none of the representatives of the political authorities has taken any stance against such manifestations. Even more, instead of mobilizing the authorized bodies to curb the tide of this antiminority discourse that is full of hatred and is intended to incite interethnic tension, the Romanian Government in its communique of 2 June 1995 assesses these views as "normal and responsible."

Considering that the attacks launched from the Parliament rostrum against the ethnic minorities are broadcast by the media and are tolerated or backed by official state elements, it is no wonder that leading representatives of ethnic minorities are threatened with bombs.

We hereby request that authorized state bodies should intercede to halt these nationalistic-chauvinistic manifestations, these attempts to incite hatred, and these threats. Such acts are not only unconstitutional, but also lead to increasing interethnic tension. We demand that the competent bodies should investigate these cases and find those responsible for the creation of such a tense atmosphere.

Hungarian Body Assails Education Bill

LD1906171795 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1400 GMT 19 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania [HDUR] has held out the prospect of demonstrations if the Romanian Senate approves the present variant of the education bill. Tibor Bogdan reports from Bucharest.

[Bogdan] The HDUR will appeal to the Constitutional Court for intervention, and turn to the relevant international organizations regarding this matter.

The Hungarian Teachers Association of Romania has already issued a strong statement calling upon the Hungarian community of Romania to protest in a single voice against the document, which is a significant step back, even compared to the communist era. At the same time the association expects support from any political and civic organizations which are concerned about democratization in Romania. They also expect support from Hungarian historical churches.

Our national community is not prepared to give up the use of our mother tongue, the basic right to education in our mother tongue; there is no law that would force them to do this, the statement of the Hungarian Teachers Association of Romania points out.

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Federal

Milosevic, Bulgarian Minister Discuss Relations

LD1906151695 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1409 GMT 19 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 19 Jun (TANJUG)—Republican President Slobodan Milosevic today received Bulgarian Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski and his aides in the course of their visit to our country.

President Slobodan Milosevic and minister Pirinski exchanged views on the most significant issues of interest for the development of relations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria and the current political situation in the region, the office of the Serbian president says in a statement.

It was stated that the Serbian and Bulgarian people shared mutual friendly feelings and aspirations toward progress in the entire Balkans area.

Both sides expressed an interest in developing comprehensive and goodneighborly cooperation between the two countries and drew attention to the shared economic interests based on the benefits of mutual economic links and the results that had been achieved in the sphere of bilateral economic cooperation in the past.

The willingness of both countries to intensify not only economic but cultural, sporting, and other forms of cooperation was reaffirmed even under the sanctions regime which, despite having limited some possibilities, has not brought about a breakdown in communications between economic and other partners from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.

During the talks, mutual commitment was stressed to solving the crisis in the area of the former Yugoslavia by political means and consolidating stability and peace in the Balkans, something that will be facilitated by a steady development of goodneighborly relations, mutual understanding, and respect for equality in relations between the Balkan peoples and states.

The talks were also attended by Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Stojanovic, the statement says.

Pirinski Urges Lifting Embargo

LD1906175295 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1647 GMT 19 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 19 Jun (TANJUG)—"Nobody can tell Bulgaria it is a bad member of the international community because it wishes to persuade the world that the sanctions against Yugoslavia are counterproductive," Bulgarian Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski said at a joint news conference with Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic.

Saying that contacts between the two neighboring and friendly countries are necessary, Pirinski stressed that the first part of his visit to Belgrade was devoted to examining bilateral issues, particularly the situation in crisis areas of former Yugoslavia. "The desire for the peaceful resolution of the conflict was confirmed again—reaching political solutions and simultaneously lifting the sanctions," the Bulgarian minister said.

According to the Bulgarian minister, the sanctions represent an obstacle to bilateral cooperation, and therefore we have to be especially prepared for the period after they have been abolished. In this sense, the global need for a normalization of the situation in the Balkans and an improvement of bilateral relations can be seen within the framework of Europe-wide integration efforts. There is a striving toward a Europe with single standards and a single attitude toward all countries in the name of progress, cooperation, and individual interests, Pirinski explained.

"Bulgaria has been saying for a long time that the sanctions cause more harm than good," Pirinski said. It has also become obvious that no understanding has been shown for the damage suffered by Bulgaria and other countries because of the embargo, but it is even more important to understand the need for a completely evenhanded approach to the resolution of the crisis, which would be followed by the lifting of the sanctions. This is the goal of a joint action launched by a group of countries in Athens, the Bulgarian foreign minister said.

Minister Pirinski particularly stressed that his talks with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic have confirmed Belgrade's orientation to seek solutions through peaceful means, which is a stand shared by the Bulgarian government.

The host, Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic, said the talks were good, judging by their content and the topics discussed. The two countries are, by virtue of their fate, linked with each other and directed toward the strengthening of good neighborly relations. Jovanovic expressed the hope that this is the way to stregthen the efforts aimed at suppressing war options and returning to peace and peaceful solutions.

Jovanovic and Pirinski are continuing talks this evening. The Bulgarian minister will end his visit to Belgrade tomorrow with meetings in the Federal Assembly and talks with Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic.

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Milosevic in Talks With PRC's Jia Chunwang

LD1906185395 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1833 GMT 19 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 19 (TANJUG)—Yugoslavia views China's efforts for peace in Bosnia as support to its own eforts for a lasting peace there, said a statement released here on Monday from the office of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic.

Milosevic received Chinese State Security Minister Jia Chunwang, who is on an official visit to Yugoslavia.

The statement said peace in Bosnia was a precondition to a consolidation of overall relations in the region.

It said Yugoslavia highly appreciated China's objective and principled position toward bringing to an end the crisis in the former Yugoslavia.

Both statesmen expressed satisfaction on the successful development of bilateral relations, the statement said.

Intensive cooperation is based on firm mutual understanding and friendly ties between the peoples of Yugoslavia and China, as well as their mutual interests and strong potential yet to be exploited, said the statement.

The statement underscored the importance of respecting equality among states and nations as a presupposition to general progress and integration in the world.

Serbian Defense Minister Zoran Sokolovic and Head of the State Security Department Jovica Stanisic attended the talks.

Jovanovic Wants Inquiry Into Croatian 'Crimes'

LD1506222395 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2216 GMT 15 Jun 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] New York, June 15 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic has asked U.N. Secretary-General Butrus Butrus-Ghali to institute an inquiry into Croatian army and police troops' crimes against Serbs in Serb Krajina's Western Slavonija region.

In a letter to Butrus-Ghali, published as an official U.N. document on Thursday, Jovanovic said that, with its aggression on Western Slavonija, Croatia had flagrantly violated all relevant resolutions and other documents of the Security Council.

He said that the aggression, mounted on May 1, was a crime against civilians.

This has been confirmed by numerous witnesses, foreign media and even U.N. representatives Yasushi Akashi and Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Jovanovic said.

Mazowiecki has subsequently retracted his statements, demonstrating a lack of true interest in establishing the facts about the actual dimensions of the crime perpetrated against Serb civilians, said Jovanovic.

According to Serb Krajina figures, at least 1,000 Serb civilians were killed, 1,700 civilians and soldiers were taken to prison camps and more than 15,000 were displaced in the attack on Western Slavonija, a region in the U.N.-protected Republic of Serb Krajina.

Jovanovic said that Croatia had clamped a total information blockade on Western Slavonija and that it was not known what had become of the between 380 and 1,000 civilians and soldiers captured and taken to an unknown destination, and about 1,200 wounded Serbs.

Jovanovic said that eye-witnesses had testified that Croatian forces had shelled and strafed civilian refugees from machine-guns from the air.

He said that the object of the aggression on Western Slavonija had been to destroy the Serb population and complete the ethnic cleansing operation begun in 1991.

Serbs in Western Slavonija have no confidence in Croatian authorities and have lost confidence also in the U.N. peacekeeping force which had failed to prevent the aggression, the letter said.

In Jovanovic's view, there can be no restoration of trust and no chance of the repatriation of the between 12,000 and 17,000 Serb refugees without the withdrawal of the Croatian army and police and the placing of Western Slavonija under U.N. control.

Only about 1,200 Serbs have remained in Western Slavonija, Jovanovic said.

He stressed that the Croatian aggression had blocked the peace process which was the only way to a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

The first step towards the restoration of trust should be an efficacious and thorough investigation by the United Nations into crimes committed against Serb civilians, Jovanovic said in his letter to Butrus-Ghali.

IMF Agrees To Extend Regulation Deadline

LD1906154395 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1419 GMT 19 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 19 (TANJUG)—The board of directors of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has decided to meet a

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demand of the Yugoslav government and extend the deadline for Yugoslavia to regulate its IMF membership by Dec. 14, 1995.

"This is the fifth and, I believe, the final extension," National Bank of Yugoslavia First Vice-Governer Zarko Trbojevic told TANJUG on Monday.

Trbojevic said that since December 1992, when IMF severed all links with Yugoslavia, both the Yugoslav economy and IMF had suffered huge damages.

Yugoslavia is ready to resume cooperation with IMF and the entire international financial community as soon as the sanctions are lifted, Trbojevic said.

He said that after the sanctions are lifted, the National Bank of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav government would open talks with international financial institutions on the resolution of the problem of Yugoslavia's national debt and how to repay it.

Yugoslavia's national debt, or the capital sum of the longterm and mediumterm loans plus the interest, amount to nine billion dollars, Trbojevic said.

Trbojevic said he personally believed there would be no problem to reprogramme the debt under the most favourable terms and to regulate the payment of the outstanding obligations which have not been met due to the sanctions.

Trbojevic said that international financial circles are once again saying that Yugoslavia, in view of its economic potentials, is not a too deep in debt and that it would successfully complete the reprogramming talks.

Air Force Commander Comments on Army Reforms

AU1906192495 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 17-18 Jun 95 p 8

[Article by "V.P.M.": "We Have Not Managed To Professionalize the Army of Yugoslavia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Pozarevac—"I am not satisfied with the transformation of the Army of Yugoslavia. This process is not finished yet. Only the depolitization is finished. We have not managed to professionalize, modernize, and reorganize the Army. We have not managed to reduce the number of soldiers and at the same time maintain the attained level of combat readiness for the defense of the country. I think that we should now work on this intensively." This was stated by Ljubisa Velickovic, commander of the Air Force and Air Defense, for Pozarevac Radio on Army Day.

"True, for all this we need considerable financial resources. If we were to reduce the number of soldiers, we should enlarge our military formations. Professional soldiers should be provided with salaries and accommodation. We should also provide for storehouses for ammunition and combat equipment," Velickovic said. "The transformation of the Army of Yugoslavia will in the future be done according to material conditions. Regarding the investments made so far, I cannot be satisfied," Ljubisa Velickovic said.

Report Discusses Changing Role of Navy

AU2006102995 Belgrade VOJSKA in Serbo-Croatian 8 Jun 95 pp 6-7

[Article by Cedomir Popovic: "A New Role Under New Conditions"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The role of the navy in the country's defense has changed considerably over the last few years. Already at the time of the secession of some of the former Yugoslav republics, the navy "was thinking intensely about a redefinition of its position and role within the armed forces and in the country in general," Nikola Petrovic, the captain of a warship, has told us. Experiences from combat in 1991 and 1992 contributed even more to the reexamination of its place and role in the new situation. [passage omitted]

Its basic task is no longer to repel seaborne invasions; it is responsible for maritime combat as well as warfare on navigable inland waterways. The aim of these activities is to defend the waters, to prevent an enemy from becoming dominant at sea and on other waters, to use these locations for combat activities and to support land forces and their activities along the coast and close to navigable inland waterways. These tasks require a different strategy in the development of these forces and corresponding changes in the combat skills to be applied. To accomplish its tasks successfully, the navy must have, in addition to efficient fleets, corresponding defense units deployed along the coast, dominated by mobile missile and artillery systems, and reliable and safe systems to protect places where ships are stationed from attacks from sea and air.

The role of mines, submarines, and underwater raiders will not change considerably, but the way in which they are used will certainly change. The present level of development of these specific naval weapons and formations guarantees that they can contribute to a successful accomplishment of the navy's tasks.

Changes in Combat Skills

Since one of the navy's tasks is to support land forces deployed in coastal areas and around navigable rivers and canals, the development of the navy and its combat skills must be aimed at strengthening its seaborne

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invasion forces and more intense training of procedures employed in these activities. The improvements should include the introduction of maneuvering forces for rapid reactions in zones where they are stationed and for seaborne invasions within offensives. A significant change in combat skills will be the further integration and coordination of all activities carried out by both naval fleets and coastal defense units, embracing the simplest and the most complicated forms of combat activities that the navy can carry out. In addition to modernizing types of cooperation with land forces, the air force, and the air defense service, and providing support for units deployed along the coast and close to navigable waterways, operations organized and carried out by the navy will also be modified, since combat conditions have changed.

Mining in the sea and the use of submarine and antisubmarine forces will be adapted to the characteristics of the area of their deployment. The cooperation of fleets and coastal units with the river war fleet and land units stationed around the rivers and canals must be subjected to certain changes and developments. Camouflage in operations has also gained in importance and it is one of the subjects in the research done on the navy's combat skills.

The navy has so far been a highly professional structure. There is the wish, however, to increase the number of professionals so that their percentage reaches approximately 70 percent. Since the systems and the equipment used in maritime combat are very expensive, the organization and the training of personnel must see to it that the equipment used in combat activities and for other purposes is put to the optimum use. [passage omitted]

Modernization of Technical Systems

"Research on the navy's technical development is proceeding relatively slowly now, owing to financial and personnel problems, but it still corresponds to our long-term aims and needs," Colonel Novica Djordjevic, the head of the navy's Technical Department, has told us.

Ships are very expensive items of combat equipment and they are in use for many years, so their equipment has to be modernized several times during their years of commission. The development of this equipment is especially dynamic today. The Yugoslav Navy's technical systems can compare with the most modern in the world and their efficiency is constantly being enhanced with modifications. The modernization of vital combat systems on ships and submarines is currently under way.

Turning to underwater weapons, it must be said that the high level of research and development in the Yugoslav People's Army is still able to be maintained owing to the support of FRY institutions and companies. The introduction of a modern torpedo with an enhanced range and speed is currently under development. The depths at which noncontact antiship mines can be used are being increased. Work is being done to improve mining in antiseaborne invasions in shallow waters, on the laying of mines from aircraft not only at sea but also on inland navigable waterways, as well as to increase the mines' operational life at sea; it is to be increased by the introduction of new sources of electricity. An important increase in general efficiency should be achieved with the introduction of new explosives. Research in this field is aimed at developing modular designs for new firing devices, anchoring, and other functions.

Regarding artillery and missile weapons, as well as electronic devices and equipment on warships, new optoelectronic and computer systems are undergoing research together with the modification of existing equipment. The substitution of submarine batteries is under way now, which requires additional research and the measurement of parameters as the work proceeds. Apart from the Institute of Military Technology, other institutes and companies are also working on this (the Institute for Chemical Sources of Electricity, the Trepca company, the Nikola Tesla Institute, and others).

Over the last five years, several important studies serving as a basis for the successful development of the necessary equipment have been issued by the navy. A study of the introduction of modern surveillance radar into the command and intelligence systems and a study of their modernization may serve as examples. Parallel with the studies necessary for the development of surveillance and guided weapons, a computer for firing torpedoes from submarines has also been successfully developed, which has considerably improved the precision of targeting and has shortened the decision process in torpedo attacks. This excellent computer has been created by gifted young experts. Apart from making it possible to achieve the quality that corresponds to international standards, this computer has contributed considerably to a reduction in investment costs. After all the tests have been carried out, the navy will inform the public on these achievements.

Yugoslav Ships

"As for the development of new warships, we should realize that seven to 10 years, depending on the complexity of its task and purpose, is necessary to construct a new ship under normal conditions. We are now working on the preparation of blueprints. Experts in Yugoslavia can complete this stage of preparation and the stage of construction and equipment design, regardless

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of whether it is built in shipyards on rivers or is a complex kind of cooperation at sea," Col. Djordjevic told us. There is a long shipbuilding tradition on the rivers, where ships have been built for the needs of both the marine navy and the river fleet. Ships for foreign navies have also been built there.

A design for a ship to be used on navigable inland waterways is currently being made. This could be a ship with powerful artillery and missile equipment, modern communications and surveillance technology, and the possibility to reach high speeds in shallow waters; in other words, an original solution completely adapted to conditions in Yugoslavia, but well developed in every respect so that it could also be interesting to possible foreign buyers.

The design of two river minesweepers, which was started earlier, has been resumed with certain improvements compared with earlier series. First of all, the new minesweeper is equipped with artillery that is more efficient than previously. The nuclear, chemical, and biological protection of the minesweeper has been improved, it has central information systems for surveillance, a panoramic electric underwater locator for detecting mines in navigable inland waterways, and a better deck capacity when the ship is being used as a minelayer.

As for the facilities and professionals of the Yugoslav Army, according to Col. Djordjevic, it can be concluded that "there are no reasons to worry about the research and technical development of the navy."

[Box, p 7]

River Minesweeper

Length: 27 m

Width: 6.5 m

Height: 2.7 m

Displacement: 80 t

Speed: 26 km/hour

Drive: 2 diesel engines

Armament: 2 PAT 20 mm/4

Lancer 1/4: Strela-2M

Pontoon minesweeper: PEAM-1A

Mechanical minesweeper: MDL-2P

Acoustic-explosive minesweeper: AEL-1

Provisions of Draft Bill on Citizenship

LD1906211095 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2055 GMT 19 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 19 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav government drafted a bill on citizenship on Monday, a government statement said.

The bill envisages for citizenship to be acquired through heritage or birth in the territory of the Yugoslav Federation of Serbia and Montenegro, and to be awarded on application and under ratified international agreements.

The bill establishes legal continuity of citizenship on the basis of the legal continuity of the state of Yugoslavia.

This means that Yugoslav citizenship is automatically awarded to citizens of the former Yugoslavia who were citizens of Serbia or Montenegro at the time the constitution of the Yugoslav Federation of Serbia and Montenegro was promulgated on April 27, 1992.

Also entitled to Yugoslav citizenship are citizens of the former Yugoslav republics who were residents of the Yugoslav Federation of Serbia and Montenegro on April 27, 1992.

Irrespective of this deadline, professional officers, noncommissioned officers of and civilians working in the Yugoslav Army are entitled to Yugoslav citizenship on application, provided they are not citizens of another state.

The bill does not provide for dual citizenship as a rule, but exceptions are possible if they are in the interest of protecting a citizen of Yugoslavia.

The bill does not provide, either, for the possibility of stripping a national of citizenship, but only for renouncing citizenship or revoking it in accordance with valid international agreements.

For the first time, citizenship can be restored through reintegration.

The bill provides for some considerable facilities in acquiring yugoslav citizenship for emigrants and certain categories of foreigners, the statement said.

Article Views 'New Intelligence-Security System'

AU1406122295 Novi Sad DNEVNIK in Serbo-Croatian 11 Jun 95 p 7

[Article by Marko Lopusina: "(In)visible State Shield"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] In one week alone, Jovica Stanisic, head of the State Security Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia, mediated the

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release of 220 Blue Helmets. There would probably be nothing unusual in this, if the role of President Milosevic's special envoy were not assigned to the chief of the Serbian secret police himself. Namely, it is usual in the intelligence world to keep the names and faces of the secret service heads away from public.

This time, however, the appearance of Jovica Stanisic set a precedent that is of considerable importance not only for the state security service and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia, but also for the domestic and world public. At a time when some opposition parties are demanding that the state security sector in the Serbian and Yugoslav police be abolished and when the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs is being criticized for being too closed to the public, the public appearance of the secret service head can be understood as a political gesture, of the police opening to the public, as well as a peaceful move made in these restless areas. In any case, Jovica Stanisic's appearance has sparked interest in the work of the Yugoslav and Serbian secret police and created a need to say something about our security services and secret police to date. [passage omitted]

New Intelligence-Security System

In the wake of the breakup of the SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] in 1990, the country's intelligence-security system broke apart and there was even a war among the services, so the State Security Service of the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs, the Research and Documentation Service of the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, and even the Military Intelligence Service of the Yugoslav People's Army actually stopped functioning. This helped to strengthen the republican secret services of Serbia and Montenegro, so that, today, they function independently and, along with the Security Administration of the Yugoslav Army, represent the nucleus of a new intelligence-security system of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Jovica Stanisic is head of the State Security Department (RDB) in Serbia. After Bosko Bojovic resigned, Vukasin Maras became chief of the State Security Service in Montenegro. General Aleksandar Dimitrijevic heads the military secret police. Regarding the FRY Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the head of the Research and Documentation Service has still not been appointed, while Branko Krgo heads the Military Intelligence Service.

Serbia

Commentary Warns About Government Secrecy

AU1906103395 Belgrade NASA BORBA (supplement) in Serbo-Croatian 10-11 Jun 95 p I

[Commentary by Radivoj Cveticanin: "The Mystery of the Abolished Public"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The political pundits have suffered a resounding defeat. Not only did nobody know what Milosevic and Frasure were talking about, but they did not even know where the talks took place. Rumors mentioned Karadjordjevo, Dobanovci, and Dedinje, but it still remained a secret.

The defeat of the lobbies is unfortunately the only public result of the negotiating marathon between the president of Serbia and the American envoy on the recognition of Bosnia. On this occasion it might be appropriate to recall that Milosevic, from the very moment he first joined in the struggle for power—and that is, believe it or not, already 10 years ago—has always shown an inclination to do important things in secret. In the high position of a statesman, he has managed to cultivate that skill to impressive proportions. Obviously, a small number of people know what he intends and does, and an even smaller number know and are at the same time ready to blab about it. It may be more correct to say that the number of those absolutely familiar with the whole secret is reduced to those who reside in Tolstojeva Street [Milosevic's family residence]. In any case, his activities lack the echo that is called "court stories."

So, Frasure has been in Belgrade twice (?) and the concrete result of his mission is nothing but a series of more or less convincing speculations. The fact that the lobbies have been defeated does not automatically mean that it has come to a major step forward in the negotiations, in particular not for the Serbian side. The final reckoning will come later.

Not that the "court stories" are the problem; the problem is what happens to the political public. The issue concerns that public and yet it knows nothing about it.

The Serbian president has been warned many times that on such delicate issues he must communicate with the nation. But it has been a long time since anybody made Milosevic speak when he did not want to. Those students' demonstrations of 9 March have been forgotten. Political opposition leaders and people in the public eye have tried to show that this way, the way of avoiding the public, leads directly to authoritarianism, or even worse. There have been demands for, if not a television statement, then at least a report to parliament. At that, Vladislav Jovanovic [FRY foreign minister]

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instantly responded that the government was not obliged to face the national representatives, since, according to the Constitution, it is independent. In other words, if Kontic is not obliged to do this, why should the one who appointed him be obliged to do anything.

Lacking even the basic information about the course of the negotiations that are to decide its destiny, the public is being forced to observe everything from a distance. If it were not for Washington and the Americans and a few incautious diplomats, Belgrade would not even know who is visiting Belgrade or for what reason. And even under such limited conditions, the public is being deprived of many other things. There is the recent example of a Belgrade daily that published a correspondent's report the day before yesterday, with a statement by Kozyrev's deputy that Belgrade and Sarajevo had already reached agreement on all but one point and that recognition was at hand. The report, which would have been the journalistic scoop of the day, although published in the evening, did not survive to see the next morning. Why was a text with such information cut out of the paper? Was the correspondent crowing prematurely or did the paper, which actually "toes the line," drop the story? That is where the basic question lies: Is something being hidden from the public? And what is it, and why?

It is understandable that these state affairs are not being performed on an open stage, but it does not mean that people should not know whether or not they are taking place at all. The work in question is public in the sense of responsibility and not in the sense of methods. It is an old truth that where there is responsibility, there is the public, and vice versa. It is also known that the present Serbian regime does not respect this view very much. However, the reason that they cut the pundits out and the "court stories" around them is not because they are modest and honest and have a certain hygiene of speech [as published] and public dialogue. The reason is the absolute subjugation of the society to their uniform way of thinking and acting. When Milosevic selects somebody to work with him, the person in question has certainly been checked against blabbing, not only while he is around Milosevic, but forever.

An example proving the contrary does not exist as yet. They are trying to transfer that style of full control, which exists around the ruler, to the public as well. Of course, that tendency is nothing new and does not only appear in relation to the recognition of Bosnia. This regime has been kneading this public for many years now, in accordance with their needs and to such a degree that one might say they want to attain the sort of hypnosis that a snake employs when it wants to devour a frog. In fact, it seems that this regime and this public already are in that situation. And the fact that the regime remains silent about their final decision on the Bosnian issue cannot be a result of an exaggerated fear of public reaction—no, the public is easy to deal with—but, it is in the first place a result of the reconsideration of their own ambitions, plans, and ideas. They will deal with the public after they have dealt with themselves and their options. Meaning, they will tell the public what there is to be told.

Whenever they have something to say, and whenever what they have to say needs to have a favorable effect, then they say it without any hesitation or delay. After all, was not a television program interrupted last Friday in such a drastic and dramatic way that people froze—only to hear that the first contingent of hostages had been released; undoubtedly important news, but the emergency treatment that it was given can hardly be justified professionally.

From this point of view, it might be concluded that the regime does not have anything to say about the recognition of Bosnia as yet and that is one of the reasons for their shunning of the public. That is, Milosevic has still not made up his mind and does not want to say so—that he has not made up his mind. He probably believes that it would not go down well, just as he believes that it would not yet have a good effect if he said that he had decided to recognize Bosnia.

The silence and hiding from the public may also be due to the fact that this regime, no matter how self-confident it might be, still does to some extent shrink from the reactions of that part of the public that is now asking aggressive questions about matters. Those irritating words used to come from the Radicals. It is interesting that, for example, the state prosecutor did not mind Seselj [Radical leader] advocating the fiercest form of national reprisals, but the judge of the criminal court in Gnjilane saw it as a provocation when Seselj appeared under his office windows. If the watchfulness displayed in the former case originated from the cynicism toward a force that exercises no power, then the lack of watchfulness in the latter case originated from the fear of the authorities to lose power. [sentence as published] It is questionable whether Milosevic will succeed in making a Rutskoy out of Seselj, but it is doubtless that that is what he wants to do. In the context of our story, this case is indicative only as far as it points to the vulnerable side of Milosevic's secret diplomacy, and a certain reluctance, even nervousness, that it displays.

However, it is not possible to abolish the public permanently. Even if it is somebody like Lilic or Kontic who is given the pen to sign, the moment will come for the main actor of this story to face the public. If

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it happens to lead to glory, one should of course not expect that the main actor will share it with anybody else. However, if it happens to lead to defeat, then he should not be given the privilege to share it with those who now know nothing and are not being asked about anything.

Role of Serbian Church in Serb-Croat Conflict

95BA0265C Zagreb HRVATSKI OBZOR in Serbo-Croatian 22 May 95 pp 30-31

[Article by Goran Rosic: "Serbian Church Between Milosevic and Karadzic: Orthodox King in a Fur Hat"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *For the SPC [Serbian Orthodox Church], Milosevic was the embodiment of the Orthodox king—a communist who, emerging after 40 years of the communist darkness, would unite all Serbs in one state.*

"For the entire period from 1918 to our day, no sermon has ever been heard from the patriarch's mouth about questions of faith and the church, about man's relation to God, about loving our neighbors, about the needs of the human soul, about the moral conditions and goals of life; rather, they have always been about questions of national and political significance in the sense of imperialism and megalomania. In them, he emphasizes the two-headed eagle, the powerful king, the blood spilled on numerous battlefields, the victims of war—in short, everything that can serve the goals of extreme militant nationalism even though, in the view of the supreme head of the Serbian Church, it should not allow the barracks to outdo it in nationalist propaganda. (...)"

This is what Svetozar Pribicevic wrote in 1933 about the behavior and actions of the Serbian Orthodox Church and its patriarch Dimitrij, and of his successor Varnava. Has anything changed today? No—right after the flawlessly conducted limited campaign by Croatian forces and the final liberation of Western Slavonia, the last mask fell from the face of the SPC leadership and their supposed ecumenism. Specifically, the SPC lately has been portraying itself to the public at large as primarily a political organization and least of all as what it nominally is, a religious organization. Thus, the Synod of Bishops of the Orthodox Church, headed by Patriarch Pavle, abusing the situation in which part of the Serbian nation finds itself (and the SPC itself is largely responsible for that situation through its manipulation dating back to 1988), launched an unheard-of anti-Croat campaign through the various media of "all the Serbian lands." There was scarcely any news broadcast, either on television or radio, that did not conspicuously emphasize the tear-jerking pronouncement by Patriarch Pavle or one of his bishops against the "evil" that has befallen the Serbian population. In so doing, they took advantage of the fact that just now marks the 50th anniversary of the victory over fascism in Europe, and thus they took the opportunity to remind the world, once again, of the mythical "crimes of the genocidal ustashas—Croat Nazis" who, according to them, slaughtered 700,000 Serbs at Jasenovac alone. The liberation of this "biggest Serbian underground city" was especially infuriating to them because it was at that very site that they were preparing to hold a Pan-Serb congress on 9 May in order to attempt, through ecclesiastical-political manipulation, to once again homogenize the dispirited and increasingly exhausted Serbian nation for further fighting against all those who stand in the way of their mad plan to create a "greater Serbia." A saying was even created for this occasion: "The ustashas have revived, the Muslims have been born!" But the Croatian forces spoiled this long-planned "happening," and all that was left for the SPC and Patriarch Pavle to do was to write a communique to their people. The 5 May communique by the Holy Synod of Bishops of the SPC is especially significant. Besides the myth of the 700,000 slaughtered Serbs, it also talks about new expulsions and the destruction of the last remnants of Serbs in Western Slavonia who had survived and not been slaughtered. This was followed by numerical figures—there is no need to mention how many times they had been multiplied—relating to murdered Serbs. Most of them women and children, of course. Corpses are again floating in the Sava, the woods are filled to overflowing with corpses, and so forth. And this with "the whole world" watching. The only thing of interest in all this is the fact that the world saw completely different pictures, depicting the civilized and above all humane treatment by members of the Croatian units toward all those whom they encountered in the liberated territory, no matter who they were. But that clearly did not interest the SPC Synod. The desired goal was achieved: Panic and fear were sown among the people. However, the communique went even further.

"(...) During ethnic cleansing in 1991, the Serbian population was completely destroyed and expelled from 280 villages of so-called Mala Raska, and now, on 1 and 2 May 1995, the remaining 65 villages and all the parishes of the Slavonian eparchy have also been destroyed. (...) Amid all this, one must bear in mind that as part of the RSK [republic of Serbian Krajina], Western Slavonia respected all international agreements, from the Vance Plan on, and expected a peaceful resolution of its problems. (...) Thus, while the victorious countries, and even the vanquished ones, in World War II celebrate the victory over Nazi fascism and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia celebrates 1 May in preparation for its own victory observances, Western Slavonia and its Serbian Orthodox people

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are experiencing their final agony. (...) The Jasenovac massacre is continuing 50 years later in front of the whole world's eyes. It is obvious that what is happening today in Western Slavonia is only the first act of what is in store for the people of the RSK and RS [republic of Srpska] through the presence of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces], NATO, democratic Europe, the United States, and other 'humane and humanitarian' factors of the international community. (...)"

Militant Organ of Dictatorial Authority

These several sentences from the aforementioned information pamphlet reflect not only the hypocrisy, repeated manipulation, and even cynicism of the SPC leadership toward its own people, but also the covert desire of that institution to assume the political leadership of the Serbs across the Drina whom everyone has left in the lurch, including Milosevic and the so-called FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]. Thus, it is not without good reason that at the end of April in Pale Patriarch Pavle (who together with Seselj was the guest of honor) urged on Karadzic and the other Serbs who had come together for Easter celebrations: "Persevere, persevere, persevere!" It is obvious now that this "persevere" has multiple meanings. Moreover, this one word contains all the political aspirations of the SPC and of the action on this scene since 1988, and they in turn only confirm Pribicevic's conclusions from the beginning of this article.

When in 1987, based on the expansionist and hegemonistic program goals of the Serbian nation set out in the SANU [Serbian Academy of Science and Art] memorandum, Milosevic launched the project to realize the never-extinguished dream of Garasanin's, Moljevic's, Pasic's, and Mihailovic's "Greater Serbia," the Serbian Orthodox Church recognized in him the man with whose help it could, after 40 years, return to the political stage of Serbia, or rather the then-Yugoslavia. Moreover, at that time Milosevic was the embodiment of an Orthodox king—a communist who, emerging after 40 years of the communist darkness, would be able to unite all Serbs in one state. The metaphor of the absolutist king is very essential to an understanding of the many centuries of relations between royal authority and the church in Serbia. Specifically, throughout Serbian history the church has always played the role of militant organ of dictatorial authority, because in every regard it has depended on the king, owing exclusively to its autocephalous nature. The king appointed the patriarch and bishops by decree and made decisions about all questions relating to the church. In this way, the Orthodox faith has always been a state religion in the real sense of the word. By the same token, in all the wars of conquest waged by Serbia the SPC has followed its armed forces and after the occupation of a specific territory has "installed" and established its religion, but as the religion of the Serbian state. This is how the Montenegrin church was eradicated (a similar outcome has befallen the Macedonian church), despite the fact that it too is Orthodox. For the same reason—religious proselytism—Orthodox churches were built in wholly Catholic regions. This age-old symbiosis between the Serbian authorities and the church was shattered in 1945 when communism came to power, and the SPC did not find its bearings in that situation. Nor could it do so, because the regime that it served had always looked after it and its fate. Tito and his comrades did not need it because they had their own religion. Thus, its utter ponderousness during the communist era also led to its gradual withering among the Serbian nation. Baptisms and church weddings were few and far between and only the elderly population went to church and performed the religious rituals. But when Milosevic came to power, the SPC leadership recognized the importance of the historical moment and was unwilling to waste the opportunity. Milosevic did not reject this offer because he needed some way to further homogenize the nation. This led to the communist-Orthodox marriage, which functioned perfectly until mid-1994.

When the tub-thumping panoply of barbarism and greater Serbhood got going in 1988, the SPC assumed a significant role in it. The first real professional tub-thumpers who appeared in recognizable black attire, with long beards and fur hats, invariably bore the SPC symbols and banners. The outset of the Serbian aggression against Croatia and later against Bosnia-Herzegovina brought with it the return of those distant times when the Serbian sword and flame were incorporated into the religion of St. Sava. But even that destructive action demonstrated the dependence of the SPC, or rather its inability to survive without the support of the regime that it serves. Specifically, with respectable exceptions the clergy literally fled from all areas that they were unable to occupy, leaving their own people behind. That showed how interested they are in the people and how interested they are in expansion and hegemony effected under tank tracks. Given this behavior by the SPC leadership, it should come as no surprise that they calmly watched the ethnic cleansing of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and the eradication of all traces of Catholicism and Islam (by destroying religious structures, expelling and killing priests, mistreating and raping nuns, burning relics, books, and everything else indicating the presence of those religions in this region) in the occupied territories. Not one word about Serbian crimes over the course of four years of destruction, arson, and murder against all non-Serbs. If one considers

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all that has been seen, it is truly hypocritical and cynical for the SPC to speak out about the alleged ethnic cleansing in Western Slavonia.

Blockade on the Drina

In August 1994, Milosevic imposed a blockade on the Drina and politically excommunicated Karadzic and his clique of criminals. At first, the SPC leadership was surprised by the new situation and had a hard time accepting this first case of serious discord in the Greater Serbian movement. However, it quickly took Karadzic's side. To the Serbian Orthodox Church, Milosevic was no longer a good enough absolutist king because he had abandoned (even if only temporarily) the "Greater Serbia" project, and in keeping with its historical activity it would follow whomever does not tire of conquering the territory of others. That is now Karadzic. Karadzic cunningly took Patriarch Pavle and the bishops under his wing, and for two reasons. By linking them to him, he ensured that Milosevic would not remove him from power overnight (after all, the SPC and its opinion about vital national questions has gained a great deal of importance among the Serbian people since 1988); on the other hand, he decided to use the bishops as mouthpieces for his political goals among the Serbian people. In this process, the SPC leadership did not understand or refused to understand the essence of the dispute between Milosevic and Karadzic; i.e., that this was simply an ordinary struggle for the "honorary" title of unifier of all the Serbian lands. But even if they were to choose based on the balance of power, they would again select Karadzic, because as an anticommunist and monarchist (he even embraced Price Tomislav) he is much more acceptable than Milosevic.

By linking the SPC to himself, Karadzic has won over to his side a large part of the present-day nationalist opposition and intelligentsia in Serbia because the SPC itself constitutes a guarantee to all those forces that he will not give up on realizing the national project of a "Greater Serbia." That is why representatives of the SPC attend every session of the "people's assembly of the RS" and not infrequently make public statements that are more virulent and aggressive than those of even the politicians. Whenever there is "grumbling" at a session, a bishop comes to the rostrum to explain to the deputies the national interests and the goals that they must not abandon. Thus, the main advocates of rejecting the Contact Group plan were in fact SPC priests. Moreover, they willingly accept the role of manipulators of the truth. For example, on 2 May Banja Luka's DNEVNIK showed a picture of Primorski Bishop Lukijan standing somewhere in Bosanska Gradiska with a wig wrapped in swaddling clothes, explaining to his community that it was in fact part of the head of a girl killed by "ustasha airplanes." Compared to this sort of monstrosity, manipulating figures is child's play.

Neglecting the fact that the aforementioned communique was written in rigid political language (the priests lament the failure of the Vance Plan and other agreements but fail to say who is essentially to blame for obstructing them) and that in it the international community and all its institutions are accused of conspiring against the Serbs, it is significant that through it, the SPC Synod has for the first time directly and clearly assumed an active role in the intra-Serb dispute, which not even any politician on the other side of the Drina has dared to do thus far, by criticizing Milosevic and official Belgrade for silently watching the "murder" of Serbian babies. Such a serious charge cannot pass without further splits and convulsions on the Serbian political stage. How will Milosevic respond? That will be seen shortly.

Thus, as the preceding shows, nothing has changed since Svetozar Pribicevic's day with regard to the aspirations and activities of the Serbian Orthodox Church. On the contrary, by taking advantage of its situation and isolation, it has further radicalized its expansionist and hegemonistic intentions, but this time not simply in service to the regime, but rather as an equal political player in the creation of the "Greater Serbia" project. Ultimately, only one question remains. In the midst of this Pan-Serb madness, will there be any courageous individual priests—who surely exist—who will raise their voices and in an organized fashion oppose the current policy of the SPC leadership in order to return to the mission for which it exists—to spread peace, love, and common purpose among the people?

Measures Taken To Secure Money for Pensions

AU1506194195 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 15 Jun 95

[Report by Dusko Petrovic]

[FBIS Translated Text] Today's meeting of [Serbian] Prime Minister Mirko Marjanovic and the representatives of the Alliance of Serbian Pensioners, as well as the agreement reached on that occasion, are a logical consequence of the joint efforts to find—subject to the country's economic possibilities and the proclaimed government social policy—appropriate solutions to secure and improve the material and social position of pensioners in the present circumstances, without threatening the economic recovery program.

The republican government today adopted a proposal of changes and appendices to the Law on Pensions

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and Disability Insurance and the Law on Social Insurance Contribution. These changes implement the agreement reached with the management of the Pensioners' Alliance today on the method of calculation and adjustment of pensions to earnings in the republic. The changes to the Law on Pensions' and Disability Insurance also set a deadline for the payment of the difference to which the pensioners are entitled by law, as well as the pensions paid out on the basis of the republican decree that was in force from April 1994 to May 1995.

True to its promise that it will not permit a decline in the pensioners' standard of living and even less the erratic payment of pensions, the Serbian Government, with the changes and the appendices to the above laws passed today, wishes to persevere in its objective that pensions be paid our regularly and that they increase in line with the realistic growth of production and earnings.

Giving full support to the government of Mirko Marjanovic to persevere in the implementation of the basic goals of the economic recovery program, the management of the Pensioners' Alliance—an organization that comprises over 1,260,000 members—concurred that a consistent implementation of the program can best protect the standard of living of all residents and also pensioners.

The mere information that this year more than 3.2 billion dinars, which is a little less than a seventh of the planned GNP, will have to be set aside for the Pensions and Disability Fund, speaks volumes about the size of the funds but also about the efforts invested in securing them so as to protect the material and social position of the pensioners.

This country is doing all this and will continue to do this under conditions of inhumane economic sanctions, which means a major undertaking.

Coal Reserves, Future of Mining Industry Viewed

AU1106194395 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 8 Jun 95 p 11

[Article by M. Filipovic: "Depleted Newly Found Reserves"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Coal remains Serbia's most important energy source since it makes up 84 percent of the total reserves of the primary energy resources. In view of this, several estimates of the total reserves have been made, but these were marked by differences that emerged owing to the different criteria used to measure the extent to which some deposits had been explored.

Dr. Dusan Stojanovic of the Belgrade Mining and Geological College said at a recent Yugoslav scientific-expert symposium entitled "Mechanization in Mining" that the real situation is thought to represent the most accurate assessment, and that the total exploitable coal reserves in Serbia amount to 15 billion metric tons.

Lignite is the most dominant and makes up 99 percent of coal reserves. This coal is mainly present in four big basins (Kosovo, Kolubara, Metohija, and Kostolac). What is important, however, is that the estimates are not complete and that future geological exploration, evaluation of the deposits' condition, and the survey of technology for exploiting coal will most certainly lead to corrections in both directions.

In the period ahead, coal will be the most exploited source of primary energy in Serbia, in terms of quantity and the energy that it releases. Until about 10 years ago, it looked as if coal as a source of energy was only going to be a bridge for crossing into the 21st century, but today, no serious specialist in energy resources dares predict the end of the bridge. In Serbia, the biggest consumers of coal are thermopower plants, which consume 96 percent of the produced coal.

The remaining coal is dried and sorted out according to the needs of industry and general consumers. Of the total power plants' output of 8,760 megawatts, the power plants using lignite generate 5,371 megawatts, or 60 percent of power. In the winter, for instance, the power plants using lignite generate 75 percent of electric power.

Dr. Stojanovic takes the view that it is urgently necessary to remove some problems experienced in the normal work of strip mines so that the Tamnova Zapadno Polje (Kolubara) and Drmno (Kostolac) mines can be completed before the plans are drawn up for the Cirikovac and Drmno mines, and before the exploitation in the B field ends and a new one in the C field starts.

Regarding other important tasks, by the end of the year all the planned equipment should be installed in the Drmno mine, which is entering the final stage of construction.

In the Tamnova Zapadno Polje strip mine, whose development was suspended for almost four years, the system for removing gangue was made operational last year. With new investments this year, the production of coal could reach 2.7 million metric tons.

When it comes to the development and replacement of mines whose exploitation will end by 2005, it is urgently necessary to prepare investment-technical analyses for the development of the new mines of Sibiovac, and Krusevac (Kosovo), and Juzno Polje (Kolubara). In comparison with 1990, the production of deep mining coal last year was 23 percent smaller. The production

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of hard coal was smaller by 39 percent, brown coal by 25 percent, and lignite by 2 percent.

Kosovo

Agani Blames Milosevic for UN Hostage Situation

AU1606194895 Pristina Kosova Daily Report in English 16 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Speaking to reporters in Prishtina [Pristina] today, Dr. Fehmi Agani, vice-chairman of the Democratic League of Kosova (LDK), assessed as very significant the current trip of President Rugova of Kosova to Spain. In the meetings President Rugova had with high-ranking Spanish officials and the foreign affairs minister, Mr. Javier Solana, President Rugova was commended on the peaceful policies the Albanian people of Kosova have been pursuing in their bid to see a negotiated settlement to the Kosova issue.

Dr. Agani assessed as important the participation of the Kosova prime minister [Bukoshi] in the debates at the European Parliament, and the commitment of numerous European parliamentarians to Kosova.

The LDK vice-chairman offered an account of the recent Serbian repressive practices in Kosova, focussing in particular on the ongoing staged trials against former employees of the Kosova police personnel being staged in several Serb-run Courts in Kosova. "One can freely conclude that all these trials are a failure... and the outcome of the trials will not result in achieving the intended political goals of the Serbian regime. We have to once again reiterate, not to vindicate ourselves before the Serbian regime but to prove the truth, that neither the alleged Ministry of Interior of Kosova nor an incriminated organized activity existed. All this has been substantiated very well in the trials itself," Dr. Agani underscored. Dr. Agani remarked that the Serbian regime is intent on legalizing its terror and maintaining a threatening and frightful situation in Kosova by incriminating any form of organization of the Albanians. He said the LDK has been calling for an immediate release of the persons being tried and of other Albanian political prisoners.

Dr. Fehmi Agani hailed the statement of the U.S. secretary of defence, William Perry, that the U.S.A. would not allow the expansion of armed conflicts in Kosova, for it would affect the vital interests of the United States. He also hailed the warnings of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and of supreme allied commander in Europe, Mr. John Galvin, that U.S.A. as a leading NATO member would be military involved in case the ongoing conflict in Bosnia would extend into Kosova and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM].

Commenting on the appointment of former Swedish prime minister, Carl Bildt, as co-chairman of the Conference on Former Yugoslavia, Dr. Agani said that he viewed as very significant his initial bid to seeking a global resolution to all problems in the region. "Kosova represents one of the issues that requires a just settlement," the LDK vice-chairman said.

Speaking on the Serb President Milosevic's role in the release of UN hostages in Bosnia, Dr. Agani noted: "If one can play a key role in releasing the hostages, then undoubtedly he should assume responsibility for having them taken hostage at the first place."

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